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ABSTRACT

Economic Factors Led To The Fall Of Jin Dynasty:
Focus On The Economic Effects After Relocation Of Capital To Kaifeng
by
WONG Ming Hong
Master of Philosophy

This thesis traces ramifications of the relocation of the Imperial Capital during the
Jin dynasty. It argues the decline and fall of the Jin is rooted in this relocation. In
1209-1213 C.E., faced with the Mongol military threat and a dire shortage of grains,
the Jin dynasty (1115-1234) was forced to relocate its capital from Zhongdu to
Nanjing (Kaifeng). The sudden move, however, crippled effective governance in the
former capital and its surrouding areas, the Heshuo region. Here, poor governance
was soon followed by swarms of bandits, and in particular led to the rise of the Red
Jacket Bandits, decimating the Heshuo economy. In the new capital Nanjing
(Kaifeng), the sudden and enormous influx of military households too created serious
economic problems. They received large amount of stipend from the state but
reluctant to farm. Desperate for resources, the Jurchen waged war against the
Southern Song. It was a disaster for the Jin. The southern parts of Henan, a grain
basket province of the Jin were ravaged by war, and millions of commoners fled to
the Southern Song. More importantly, the Red Jacket Bandits, having received
supplies from the Southern Song, managed to conqueror large parts of Shandong,
another important Jin province. Together, the lost of Shandong and the destruction of
Henan, devasted Jin grain production. The Jurchen lost most of the battles against the
Mongols partly because of their weaker military. But this thesis argues that their
military defeat is also intimately tied to the precipetious decline of Jin grain
production. The grains storage in the southern parts of Henan could not provide
enough grains for the Jin armies to defend against attack. Eventually, the cities in
Henan fell one by one.
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Literature Review

The economic problems of the Jin Dynasty after relocation of the capital to Nanjing
(modern Kaifeng) relate to different spheres of disciplines. The fall of the Jin is a
complex problem not only due to its economic and military policy, but also to its
diplomatic policies - the changing relationship between the Jin and the Southern
Song should not be ignored. This literature review will briefly list out the different
scholarly arguments in a thematic arrangement.

The Fall of Dynasty
The causes of the fall of Jin Dynasty is a hotly debated topic in Jin history. Several
historians have discussed the reasons of the fall of Dynasty.
Guo Renmin’s article The Rise and Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with
Agricultural Production 1 analyzes the fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the moral
corruption of military households who frequently extorted peasants for grain,
diminishing the incentive for farmers to expand agriculture. Moreover, the Jurchens
also destroyed agricultural production. Guo's interpretation of these events is that the
commoner or peasant class had lost their class struggle against the domineering and
aristocratic military households. Another essay, Analyzing the Political Situation of
Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline, 2 by Ren Chongyue, argues that the most
important faultline was government corruption during Xuanzong’s reign (1214-1223),
while admitting other causes including relocate the capital to Nanjing, corruption of
Xuanzong, officials and soldiers’ lifestyle, financial problems, foreign relationship
with Song and military strategy may have also contributed to the fall of the Jin.
In Jurchen’s Sinicization and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire3, Liu Pujiang argues
the adoption of Han Chinese lifestyle by the Jurchen, especially their military
households, ultimately corrupted the Jurchen and was the primary reason for their
fall. Since the state heavily relied on military household, the corrupted army led to
the fall of state. Sun Jiangquan’s essay Also on the Hypothesis of “Sinicization
1

Guo Renmin 郭人民. “Jin Chao Xing Wang Yu Nong Ye Sheng Chan De Guan Xi” (The Rise and
Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with Agricultural Production), Proceedings of Song, Khitan
and Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.
2
Ren Chongyue, “Lun Jin Mo Zheng Ju Ji Qi Mie Wang Yuan Yi” (Analyze the Political Situation of
Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline), Journal of Shangqiu Normal Institute, 1987, Vol. 1.
3
Liu Pujiang, “Nu Zhen De Han Hua Dao Lu Yu Da Jin Di Guo De Fu Wang” (Jurchen’s Sinicization
and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire), China Studies, Vol. 7. Peking University Publisher, 2000.

1

Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”4 criticizes Liu’s argument with a large body of primary
sources, stating there was little relation between sinicization and the corruption of the
Jurchen. He points out there might indeed be different factors leading to the fall of
the Jurchen, but the corruption of politics and internal divisions from the reign of
Zhangzong to Xuanzong (1189-1223), were the major factors.
Tao Jing-shen’s research on The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China5 provides a brief
academic review on the fall of the state. He quotes Liu Qi and Yuan Haowen’s view
that the fall of Jin was due to incomplete sinicization. He also quotes the opposite
opinion that the fall of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture of Song and
the harsh policy of Liao. Tao comments that sinicization was not the cause of the
decline of Jin, but is more prominently linked to the mass defections of Chinese and
Khitan officials as well as a strong Mongol military machine.
Song Dejin also discusses this topic in Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty 6 and
provides further quotations of historians’ arguments through quoting several tradition
historians’ view on related topic and concluded nine arguments. He quotes Yuan
Haowen who witnessed the fall of Jin’s and attribute it to fate, while a similar
opinion in Ming Dynasty was also made by He Qiaoxin. The second opinion, raised
by Liu Qi, is wide-spread discrimination against Han Chinese. The third opinion, by
Kublai Khan, was that the Jin had fell in the hands Confucian scholars. The forth
opinion is Genghis Khan attacked Jin on 1211 weakened the foundation of the state,
quoted in Biography of Chenyu of Jin Shi. The fifth opinion, raised by the Qing
scholar Zhao Yi, is that the Jin violated the peace treaty. The sixth opinion was by
another Qing scholar. Li Ciming, who wrote a book review on Gui Qian Zhi
(Memoirs of Liu Qi) and suggests that it was due to Xuanzong who gave up Zhongdu
and relocated the capital to Nanjing. The seventh argument, introduced by Li Ye, is
about the use of 'wicked’ generals in the Sanfengshan battle. The eighth argument is
about Song scholar Wu Qian’s opinion on the currency and inflation problem caused
by large amount of paper money issued. The ninth argument, which was more
4

Sun Jiangquan, “Also on the Hypothesis of “the Hanization Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”, The
Proceedings of the International Symposium on the History and Archeology of the Liao and Jin
Dynasties, 2012, Vol. II.
5
Tao Jing-shen, The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization, Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1977. The opinion on the fasl of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture
of Song and the harsh policy of Liao was raised by editor of Dynastic History of Jin Shi
6
Song Dejin, edited by Han Shiming, “Da Jin Fu Wang Bian” (Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty) ,
Proceeding of Song Liao Jin, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publisher, 2007.
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dominated argument, was due to sinicization. This argument raised by Qing’s
emperor Taizong and Gaozong. Song Dejin pointed out the corruption of military
affair after the reign of Zhangzong was the key factor led to the fall of Dynasty.
Another important factor was the failure of foreign policy. Recently, Yu Wei’s recent
research Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of
Jin Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political
Center of Jin Dynasty,7 based on geographic perspective, point out the relocation of
capital to Yanjing (Modern Beijing) was the first step to the weakening of the state.
Also, there were several debates on the factors related to relocation of capital. Some
thought it was a sound idea for relocation of capital while some opposed the idea.
Cai Dongzhou’s article Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline
of Jin Dynasty8 suggests that it was necessary for the Jurchens to relocate the capital
because of geography. At the time, the powerful Mongols were poised to invade
China, but large swaths of land near the old capital were not defensible terrain. He
stated that it was a sensible decision for Xuanzong to relocate the capital to Kaifeng
in order to stabilize Jin central authority. The fact that the Jin were able to muster a
strong defense at the new capital, Nanjing (Kaifeng), is evidence that relocating the
capital was a decision of foresight. In addition, he opined that the relocation of the
capital had little to do with other disastrous events. The war with Southern Song was
independent to the relocation of capital, and it was also not related to the loss of
Zhongdu. He points out the that it was ten years after the relocation until general Wu
Xian 武仙 retreated from the Hebei region. The loss of Zhongdu and Hebei region
were not related to the relocation of the capital. It should be noted, nevertheless, the
article does not mention the factors that drove the Mongols launching a western
expedition, and also does not state that Wu Xian controlled Hebei region in 1225 just
because he defect Mongol, assassinated Shi Tianyi, Mongolian general and joined
Red Jacket Bandits, Jin actually lost Heshuo in 1220. Huo Mingkun and Hu Ye’s
article Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to Kaifeng9 also shows the similar argument as
7

Yu Wei, Qian Yan, Qi Yan Yu Jin Zhi Shuai Wang: Jin Dai Zheng Zhi Zhong Xin Zhuan Yi Zhi Zheng
Zhi Di Li Wen Ti (Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of Jin
Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political Center of Jin
Dynasty),
Seminar
published
in
Chaoxing
Website
<
http://video.chaoxing.com/play_400007062_94865.shtml>
8
Cai Dongzhou, “Jin Chao Qian Bian Yu Jin Chao Mie Wang” (Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the
Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty), Journal of Guizhou Normal Institute, 1995. Vol. 1.
9
Huo Mingkun, Hu Ye, “Shi Xi Jin Xuanzong Qian Du Kaifeng” (Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to
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Cai's article. It analyzes the political and military situation, and then proceeded to
debate and discusses the several possible locations for relocation. He refuted all the
other opinions, excpet Nanjing (Kaifeng). This article also stated the advantages of
relocating the capital. However, the article did not describe the drawbacks of moving
the capital to Nanjing. Furthermore, it quotes Da Jin Guo Zhi, an unreliable record,
on the debate of relocation of capital. The faults of the article raised criticism from
their colleague. 10 Li Fanghao’s article Discussion about the strategy error of Jin
dynasty capital moving Kaifeng11 comments the relocation of capital might not be a
good idea because hundreds of court officials turned down the suggestion. Xuanzong
decided to relocate the capital just because he trusted Shuhu Gaoqi and his judgment.
He also argues that after Xuanzong moved to Nanjing, Xuanzong became
complacent. He also points out several problems emerged after the relocation of the
capital, including territory lost, financial problems, military crises. He states the Jin
moved the capital to Nanjing led to the fall of Dynasty. It was only because the
Mongols were preoccupied with their western expeditions that the Jin could continue
to survive for twenty years after the relocation of the capital. He suggests the state
should stay in Zhongdu which was defensible or move the capital back to Shangjing
Huilingfu (Heilongjiang) which was far away from Mongolian invaders. Forty years
before Li published his article, this idea was raised by Herbert Franke. He points out
“one reason was certainly that from 1219 onward Chinggis Khan directed the greater
part of his forces westward in order to attack western Asia; another factor may well
have been the fear of the Mongols that united loyal Jurchens and Chinese against a
common foe.”12

Study on Historiographies
There are several predominant scholars who have deep analysis on the primary
historical sources related to the topic. Several historians describe the contribution of
Kaifeng), Northern Antiques, 2009. Vol. 4.
10
The research was careless as Yuan Dynasty historian Su Tianjue had pointed out the history
recorded in Jin Guo Zhi was unreliable. The mistake in the part related to relocation of capital was the
most serious. Su Tianjue, Zi Xi Wen Gao, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1997. 25, p. 423. 蘇天爵，
滋溪文稿，北京：中華書局。 “金國志，皆不及見國史，其說多得於傳聞。蓋遼末金初稗官小
說中間失實甚多，至如建元改號，傳次征伐，及將相名字，往往杜撰，絕不可信。如張師顏南
遷錄尤為紕繆。”
11
Li Fanghao, Discussion about the strategy error of Jin dynasty capital moving Kaifeng, Historical
Studies, 2012, Vol. 6.
12
Cambridge History of China Vol. 6. P. 259.
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private history to the edit of Jin Shi. The significant research is Zhang Boquan,
Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan’s article Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi13, Wang Mingsun’s
article Edit of State History and the History of Dynastic History of Jin Shi14 and Chan
Hok-lam’s article, Wang O’s contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (11151234)15. On the other hand, scholars of Chinese literature also argue the alternative
sources on analysis of Jin Dynasty history, like the study of embassies’ record. Such
as West Stephen’s book Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature16 and article,
Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi 17 and Liu Pujiang’s Song
embassy in the Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy18

Political History
Furthermore, there are several significant historical researches on the political history
of Jin Dynasty affected economic development and ruling policies of Jin Dynasty.
James T. C. Liu’s article The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points19
provides a comparison between Jurchen and Mongolian’s invasion and ruling. Wang

13

Zhang Boquan, Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan, “Zhongzhou Ji Yu Jin Shi” (Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi)，
Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. It described
the contribution of Yuan Haowen’s Zhongzhou Ji to the edit of Dynastic History of Jin Shi (Jin Shi). It
also pointed out the differences in recording historical facts between Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi and the
judgment on some of persons. In addition, it stated the importance on using Zhongzhou Ji as
supplements on studying Jin Dynasty history.
14
Wang Mingsun, “Jin Xiu Guo Shi Ji Jin Shi Yuan Liu” (Edit of state history and the history of
dynastic history of Jin Shi), Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia
Publisher, 2009. It provided the process of records in Jin Dynasty and the referred sources and
provided major references of Jin Shi.
15
Chan Hok-lam, Wang O’s contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-1234), China and
the Mongols, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999. It analyzed the role of Wang O in editing
Jin Shi during Yuan Dynasty and the relationship of his work Runan Yishi and Jin Shi of late Jin.
16
West Stephen, Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature, Ann Arbor, Mich. : University
Microfilms International, 1981. It provided analysis on several important literatures related to Jin
Dynasty.
17
West Stephen Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi. International Conference of
Cultural Meanings of Mobility. Mar 2008. It introduced three different diaries wrote by Song
embassies, including Zhou Hui’s Record of a Northbound Cart, Cheng Zhuo’s Record of Being Sent
as an Emissary to the North and Fan Chengda’s Record of Holding the Reins. In the article, he used
literature perspective, provided translation and compared the different perspective on description of
Henan.
18
Liu Pujiang, “Song Dai Shi Chen Yu Lu Kao” (Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy),
10-13 Century China’s Cultural Shock and Integration, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publisher, 2006.
It analyzed the writing purposes, types of records and provided an annotated bibliography of the
records of the embassies of Song Dynasty.
19
Liu T. C. James, The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points, China Under Jurchen
Rule, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. He pointed out the failure policy for Jin
Dynasty to abrogate puppet Liu Yu led to the loss of support for Han Chinese to support the conquered
whole China. He quoted Wu Xi’s defect did not gained support from Han Chinese as example, and
contrast with Mongolian’s use of Han Chinese generals to conquered China.
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Hongzhi’s article Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the “Long Xing Peace
Agreement” (Between Southern Song and Jin) 20 analyzes Jin Dynasty economic
advantages and its economic development after signing peace settlement with Song.
On the aspect of general history of Jin Dynasty, He Junzhe’s Jin Dynasty History21
also offers a detail introduction on political and economic historical background. He
comments that Xuanzong attempted to solve the economic crisis, even the southern
expedition was one of the policies to solve the economy. But these solutions failed to
solve the major economic problems.22

Military History
The success of military campaign was related to military preparation, including
supply and logistics of grains. The result of wars further affected the economy.
Huang Kuan-chong’s Work Collection of History of Southern Song 23 , Anti Jin
Voluntary Army in Southern Song24 and The Regional Military Forces in Southern
Song China: Studies of Regional Armies and Local Militias 25 adopt Song’s
perspective to analyse the effect of these military force contributed to Shandong
situation in late Jin. Li Tianming’s Song Yuan War History 26 describes Shandong
bandits and Song, Mongol and Jurchen’s transition of political situation and their
interaction after Jurchen moved to Kaifeng (1214) Public opinions, officials’
arguments, geography and military power are analyzed. Han Zhiyuan’s Military
History of Southern Song and Jin27 provides a general description on military system,
organization and the wars between Song and Jin. Wang Zengyu also did a research
on Military System of Khitan and Jurchen28. It was a pioneer and deep research on
20

Wang Hongzhi, “Jin Shizong Yu Long Xing He Yi” (Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the
“Long Xing Peace Agreement” (Between Southern Song and Jin) ), Proceedings of Liao and Song
History Vol. 2, Beijing: Documents Publisher, 1987.
21
He Junzhe, Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History), Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992.
22
He Junzhe, Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History), Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992. Pp.
436-437.
23
Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Shi Yan Jiu Ji (Work Collection of History of Southern Song). Taipei:
Xin Wen Feng, 1985.
24
Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Shi Dai Kang Jin De Yi Jun (Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern
Song), Taipei: Lian Jing Publisher, 1988.
25
Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Di Fang Wu Li: Di Fang Jun Yu Min Jian Zi Wei Wu Li De Tan Tao
(The Regional Military Forces in Southern Song China : Studies of Regional Armies and Local
Militias). Taipei: Dong Da Gu Fen Tu Shu You Xian Gong Si, 2002.
26
Li Tianming, Song Yuan War History, Taipei: Shi Huo Publisher, 1988.
27
Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Jun Shi Shi (Military History of Southern Song and Jin), Beijing:
Military Science Publisher, 1984.
28
Wang Zengyu, Liao Jin Jun Zhi (Military System of Khitan and Jurchen), Baoding: Hebei
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military system of Jin Dynasty.

Jin-Song Relationship
In addition, the interaction between Jurchen and Song was interrelated with Jin-Song
relation after Jurchen relocated the capital. Zhao Yongcun’s History of Jin-Song
Relationship29 describes the general transition of Jin-Song relationship and provided
some comments on these policies. Richard Davis has published two books on SongJin relation in Song perspective. In Court and Family in Sung China 960-127930, he
analyzes the foreign policies, which were adopted by three Song Prime Ministers
from Shi family. In The Cambridge History of China31, he describes the raise and fall
of Red Jacket Bandits in Shandong and the transition of Song’s court policy to
Jurchen. Wang Gaofei’s The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song-Jin
Relationship32 also uses Song’s perspective to discuss Song’s termination of paying
tribute and the deterioration of Song Jin relationsip during the reign of Xuanzong (or
Song’s Jiading). Other work collections wrote by Song’s scholars were referred, but
there was a lack of analysis on the worsening relation in Jurchen perspective.

Economic History
There are a number of foreign scholars who have conducted deep researches on the
economic history related to Jin Dynasty. Takahashi Hiroomi’s book, Study of
Monetary History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty33, provides a research on the late
Jin’s currency system. It refers to political and social factors. It also describes the
economic problem caused by paper money. Mikami Tsugio’s book, Research on

University Press, 2011. The research referred to wide ranges of historical documents and work
collections and did a careful selection on sources. The research systemically managed the messy
information of Treatise of War in Jin Shi, described the military household system, cavalryman,
military expenditures, weapons, etc.
29
Zhao Yongcun, Jin Song Guan Xi Shi (History of Jin-Song Relationship), Beijing: People Publisher,
2005.
30
Davis Richard Lee, Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship
Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou, Duke: Duke University Press, 1986.
31
The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5: The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279 (Part
1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, political narrative for the reigns of Kuang-tsung,
Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung.
32
Wang Gaofei, The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song － Jin Relationship, Journal of
Mianyang Normal University, 2011, vol. 30.
33
Takahashi Hiroomi, Trans. Lin Songtao. Song Jin Yuan Huo Bi Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Monetary
History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty),Shanghai: Shanghai Classical Publisher, 2010.
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Jurchen in Jin Dynasty34 also presents an in depth analysis on military household
system Mengan Mouke 猛安謀克 about its corruption, degeneration and economic
impact in late Jin Dynasty. Tao Jing-shen’s another work, Analysis on Jurchen
History,35 also discusses the social crisis of Jurchen society since middle Jin Dynasty.
It suggests that it was due to the corruption of Jurchen people’s lifestyle gained
special right. Toyama Gunji’s research, Study of Jin Dynasty History, 36 linked up
economic situation to analyze mid-Jin’s decision on military actions to Song and
Mongol. It also describes the southward movement of Yellow River during the reign
of Zhangzong and its effect on the tension between Jurchen and Han Chinese, and
stated it might be one of the reasons for the fall of dynasty.
On the general economic history of Jin Dynasty, Herbert Franke describes the
political situation of late Jin and introduces the economic development, trading,
currencies, transportation and industries of Jin.37 Chinese scholar Zhang Boquan’s
General Economic History of Jin Dynasty38 is an early general economic history of
Jin Dynasty done in China. Qi Xia’s General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin,
Volume of Society and Economy39 also provides a general introduction of economy
during Jin Dynasty.
In the research specific to the commercial development, Wang Depeng’s The
Commercial economy research of the Jin Dynasty 40 offers a general study of
commercial development. He suggests that despite the recovery of economy of the
Central Plain during mid Jin Dynasty, the commercial activities could not compare to
the level of Northern Song. Furthermore, the research related to late Jin’s economic

34

Mikami Tsugio, trans. Jin Qicong. Jin Dai Nu Zhen Yan Jiu (Research on Jurchen in Jin Dynasty),
Harbin: Heilongjiang People Publisher, 1984.
35
Tao Jing-shen, Nu Zhen Shi Lun (Analysis on Jurchen History), Banqiao: Daoxiang Publisher, 2010.
36
Toyama Gunji, trans. Li Dongyuan, Jin Chao Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Jin Dynasty History), Harbin:
Heilongjiang Choson Ethnics Publisher, 1988.
37
Herbe Franke, edited by Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978.
38
Zhang Boquan, Jin Dai Jin Ji Shi Lue (General Economic History of Jin Dynasty), Shenyang:
Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1981.He described the population, industries, business, etc. The book
published just after Cultural Revolution, he used a radical socialism perspective to analyse Jin’s
economic development.
39
Qi Xia, Liao Song XI Xia Jin Dai Tong Shi (General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin), Volume of
Society and Economy, Beijing: People Publisher, 2010.
40
Wang Depeng, Jin Dai Shang Ye Jin Ji Yan Jiu (The Commercial Economy Research of the Jin
Dynasty), Beijing: Documents on Social Science Publisher, 2011. The book includes different
industries, trading, tax, etc. A wide range of sources including Song, Jin and Yuan’s work collection
and archaeological reports were referred. This is also the first study of commercial history of Jin
Dynasty.
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history include Japanese scholar Katō Shige’s Trading of Song and Jin 41 which
provided a detail research on trading between Song and Jin. It describes the
installation of trading, regulations of markets, exchanged product. Tea, Money and
Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin42 provides further detail in these specific
products. He describes the smuggling activities on tea along the Huai River. He also
quotes the work collections of Song and Jin to provide addition information on the
flow of money. Furthermore, he compares the price of silk between Song and Jin and
refers the data of production of silk in northern Song to explain the selling of silk
from Jin to Song to exchange for tea. Quan Hansheng’s Smuggle Trading Between
Song and Jin43 based on Katō Shige’s research to provide extra sources on analysis.
He points out the demand and supply of the above products between two states, and
provided a unique argument of the necessary to smuggle for these two states as that
there were different products produced in different latitude, but the river travelled in
the similar latitude. Since there was strict regulation of markets trading between
Song and Jin, thus the problems of smuggling rose. Qiao Youmei’s research, The
Struggle of Coins in the Trading between Song and Jin44 further analyzes the change
and the purpose of economic competition, and comments that Jin had intention and
planning to procure the coins from Song. In 1982, mainland scholar Chen Xinquan
also did a research, Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading45 which is a detail, but
highly similar with previous findings by other scholars.
On the specific theme of trading, Japanese scholar Kato Shige was one of the
pioneers for the research of Jin Dynasty economic history. His research, Study of
Gold and Silver during Tang and Song Dynasty46 based on his good knowledge of
41

Katō Shige, Trading of Song and Jin, Zhongguo Jin Ji Shi Kao Zheng (Examine on Chinese
Economic History), Beijing: Commercial Publisher, 1963. This research not only referred to Jin Shi,
but also quoted a large number of Song’s sources including Jiangyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu, Song Hui
Yao , Wen Xian Tong Kao, etc. Thus, it provided a detail analysis on different types of products and
the different demands of goods between two states.
42
Katō Shige, Tea, Money and Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin, Beijing: Commercial
Publisher, 1963.
43
Quan Hansheng, “Song Jin Jiang De Zou Si Mao Yi” (Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin),
Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song
Man Book Store, 1973. His research provided on quotations in other chapters in Song Hui Yao
together with Treaties of Food and Commodes of Song Shi together as reference, to analyse the
smuggling activity of grains, tea, salt, ginger, military necessities and money.
44
Qiao Youmei, “Song Jin Mao Yi ZHong Zhen Duo Tong Bi De Dou Zhen” (The Struggle of Coins
in the Trading between Song and Jin), Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1985.
45
Chen Xinquan, “Song Jin Que Chang Mao Yi Kao Lue” (Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading),
Proceeding of Liao and Jin History, Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1985.
46
Kato Shige, translated by Federal Reserve Bank of China, Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and
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Song’s Monetary History, he compares the usage of silver with Song and discusses
the development of the regulation of the use of silver and the effect on paper money.
American scholar, Chan Hok-lam’s Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the
Jurchen-Chin Dynasty47 quotes some Song sources to provide detail analysis on the
regulations of cross border markets. Chan also clarified the price of tea purchased
from Song, recorded in Song Shi. Chan also based on the consumption of large
amount of tea from Song to Jin to further explain the lack of resources, weak
foundation and highly dependent of economy in Jin Dynasty.

Regional Economic History
Regional economic history could enhance the understanding of the development of
Central Plan, but there was a lack of study of the Central Plain of Jin Dynasty.
Recently, Chinese scholars have begun to conduct research on regional economic
history, to analyze the evolution of the economic and industrial development of the
region. However, part of the research just briefly describes Jin Dynasty’s economic
development.Yuan Ji’s article Commoner’s Livelihood in the Northern Region of
Yellow River during the Transition between Jin and Yuan Dynasty48 was a pioneer
research, providing detail description on the livelihood of commoners under the
policy of late Jin and early Yuan government. A wide range of inscription on the
gravestone recorded in work collections of early Yuan scholars were quoted, as a
valuable supplementary record for the official Jin and Yuan history on basic level of
society.
On the economic research on Hebei, Xie Zhicheng has published an article Jin
Dynasty’s Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei49. Two years ago, Xing
Tie’s Hebei’s Economy in Song Liao Jin Period50 provided a general introduction of
economy in different aspects in Hebei region. However, the research was lack of
Song Dynasty, Hong Kong: Lung Mun Book Store, 1970.
Chan Hok-lam, Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty, Studies on the
Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.
48
Yuan Ji, Commoners’ “Jin Yuan Zhi Ji Jiang Bei Zhi Ren Min Sheng Huo” (Commoners’
Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River During the Transition Between Jin and Yuan
Dynasty), Collection of Thesis of Yuan Shi, Taibei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1974.
49
Xie Zhicheng, “Jin Dai He Bei Jin Ji De Fa Zhan He Hui Fu” (Jin Dynasty’s Development and
Recover of Economic in Hebei), Hebei Academic Journal, 1990, Vol. 3. In the article, he referred to a
wide range of Jin and Song sources, including literary sketches, gazetteers and work collections,
together with the archaeology report, to offer an overall research on the economic development in
Hebei and analyze the rise and fall of the economy there.
50
Xing Tie, Hebei’s Economy in Song Liao Jin Period, Beijing: Science Publisher, 2011.
47
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information and analysis on the rise and fall of the economy. This research has plenty
of room for further improvement. On the research on Henan economic history,
Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen’s recent published book Ancient
Henan Economic History51 is a general economic history of Henan. It discusses the
evolution of Henan’s economy. However, it seldom mentions the economic problems
of Henan in late Jin. Thus my thesis will mainly analyze the economic problems
pertaining to the late Jin period.

Study on Tax
On the study of tax, Herbert Franke’s A Note on Wine52 described the drinking habit
on Jin Dynasty and the wine tax collected. Furthermore, Liu Pujiang also analyzed
on the tax of Jin Dynasty in his articles, Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax
in Jin Dynasty53 and Analysis on Jin Dynasty’s Miscellaneous Levies.54

Population History
Population size is one of the heated discussion topics among Chinese scholars. They
have attempted to speculate the amount of grains consumption and tax collection. On
the analysis of population and households’ history of Jin Dynasty, Wu Songdi’s
Chinese Migration History, 55 analyzing work collections, gazetteers and official
histories, study the southward movement of population during the reign of Zhenyou
(1213-1217). The origin and destination of migration are identified, and the number
of migration is speculated. It is essential to fill up the gap from the Jin Shi. His book,
Chinese Population History 56 , further elaborates the argument by analyzing the
51

Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen, Gu Dai Henan Jinji Shi (Ancient Henan Economic
History), Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2012.
52
Herbert Franke, A Note on Wine, Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty, Vermont: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 1997. He commented the large consumption of wine was a habit of northern
people, similar to Mongols. He quoted several sources of Accounts of Great Jurchen, which might
undermine the argument.
53
Liu Pujiang, “Lun Jin Dai De Wu Li Yu Wu Li Qian” (Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax
in Jin Dynasty), Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher,
1999.
54
Liu Pujiang, “Jin Dai Zha Shui Lue Lun” (Analysis on Jin Dynasty’s Miscellaneous Levies),
Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. The
previous one described the significant of the setup of united property tax and labor service policy, and
introduced the detail of the implementation of tax. In the later one, he also provided an introduction on
all types of tax recorded in Jin Shi.
55
Wu Songdi, Zhongguo Yi Min Shi (Chinese Migration History), Volume 4. Fuzhou, Fujiang People
Publisher, 1998.
56
Wu Songdi, Zhongguo Ren Kou Shi (Chinese Population History), Volume 3. Shanghai: Fudan
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population density and compare with the previous dynasty, to prove that during mid
Jin Dynasty, there was negative population growth in Henan.
Furthermore, the topic of households recorded in the Treaties of Geography in Jin
Shi was a heated debate among historians. Liang Fangzhong’s research Survey on
Chinese Historical Households, Farmland and Tax57 based on Treaties of Geography,
identifies that Jin had an overall population increase in 1223. However, Han
Guanghui’s Correctness of Households in Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi58 points
out that there was unlikely a sharp population growth in Kaifeng from 1152-1207. He
suggests that Kaifeng’s households should be around 400,000 during the reign of
Zhangzong and the numbers in Treatise of Geography was recorded in 1207. The
1,746,210 households recorded in Treatise of Geography should be during the reign
of Xuanzong.Wang Yumin’s Analysis on households recorded in Treatise of
Geography in Jin Shi 59 provides supplementary arguments and points out the
different number of households recorded in Treatise of Food and Commodes and
Treatise of Geography and notes that the number of households in Treatise of
Geography should not be recorded in 1208. It also suggests that different regions
should be recorded in different time periods. Liu Pujiang’s article Study of Jin
Dynasty Households60 suggests the year the household figures recorded in Treatise of
Geography was in 1207. But this figure did not include the military household. After
including the military households, it had a consistence growth rate of household and
population by around 9 and 10%, compared with previous year. He also points out
register of refugees and migration led to the increase of number. He also speculates
that the households in the Central Plain, with reference to Yuan Shi, should be around
2.5 million and 13,600,000 people in the period of late Jin. He also proves that the
number of households referred to Treatise of Food and Commodes as the Treatise of
Geography was not reliable.
University Press, 2000.
57
Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo Li Dai Hu Kou, Tian Di, Tian Fu Tong Ji (Survey on Chinese
Historical Households, Farmland and Tax), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publisher, 1980.
58
Han Guanghui, “Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu SHu Xi Nian Zheng Wu” (Correctness of Households in
Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi), Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. He also pointed out
the population dropped rapidly after the war in late Jin recorded in biographies, thus the population
number should not be recorded in late Jin.
59
Wang Yumin, “Jin Shi Di Li Zhi Hu Kou Xi Nian Bian Xi” (Analysis on households recorded in
Treatise of Geography in Jin Shi), Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi, Beijing: Chinese
Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009.
60
Liu Pujiang, “Jin Dai Hu Kou Yan Jiu” (Study of Jin Dynasty Households), Historical Essays on
Liao and Jin Dynasty, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999.
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Geographic History and Studies of Capitals
There was a close connection of selection of capitals with the economic development,
transportation and geographic position. The following will describe some of the
important researches in related aspect.
On the capital studies, Shi Nianhai’s Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture 61
describes the studies of ancient capitals and its criteria. It also discusses the relation
between the capital and military, natural factor, economy, transportation and other
factors. Wang Hui’s Chinese Geographic History62 also describes ancient capital’s
purpose of setting and the advantages and disadvantages on setting there. He points
out Song still set the capital in Kaifeng because of the convenience of canal
transportation.63 Kaifeng was “the essential place for southern goods to transport to
the north. There was none of natural barrier. Also it faced the threat from Yellow
River. It was for the convenience of canal transportation but lack of long term
insight”64 Liu Yingchun’s Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities65 is a recent research
on the study of the evolution of ancient capital Kaifeng. .
In the studies related to Jin Dynasty transportation, Quan Hansheng’s Transportation
Canals and Tang Song Emperor66 argues the use of function of canals transportation
during the period of Song Jin confrontation, and the consequences of the interruption
of the canals.

Other Studies
Labour services also related to the economic development. Chan Hok-lam’s Labour
Service Under the Chin introduced different types of labour service and the related
taxes. It also discussed the labours mobilized through the construction of Kaifeng
61

Shi Nianhai, Zhongguo Gu Du He Wen Hua (Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture), Beijing:
Zhonghua Book Store, 1998.
62
Wang Hui, Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History), Taibei: Student Book Shop, 1979.
63
Wang Hui, Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History), Taibei: Student Book Shop, 1979,
p. 353
64
Wang Hui, Zhongguo Li Shi Di Li (Chinese Geographic History), Taibei: Student Book Shop, 1979,
p. 53
65
Liu Yingchun, Jie Mi Kaifeng Cheng Xia Cheng (Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities), Beijing:
Science Publisher, 2009. It referred to a wide range of sources including work collections, and also
archaeological report to analyze the history of Kaifeng region and the construction and repair of the
city. It based on archaeological findings to prove the scale of reconstruction of Kaifeng city during the
reign of Hailingwang (1150-1161)
66
Quan Hansheng, Tang Song Di Guo Yu Yun He (Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor),
Taibei: Chunghwa Book, 1956.
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capital repair on rivers, and other factors.

In this thesis, it will focus on the problems caused by relocation of capital to Kaifeng
in late Jin. The research will focus on economic factor, policies and the consequences.
There is not doubt that the fall of Jin Dynasty was mainly due to military loss to
Mongols. Mongols was the most recent highly uncivilized authority which
successfully eliminated one of the most civilized states, Jin Dynasty. It had
eliminated 40 states including Xi Xia before the fall of Jin,67 and later conquered
entire China proper and most region of Eurasia. Thus, the economic factor was
interrelated to the military loss. Furthermore, the failure on military strategy during
the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213) caused the damage of Hebei and Shandong
was another major reason. However, we should not neglect the factor, particularly the
drawbacks of several economic policies implemented after Xuanzong relocated to
Kaifeng, including destruction of the economy and social foundation of the state.
That further undermined the state’s military strength.

67

Runan Yishi, 2, p. 20.
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Background
During mid-Jin Dynasty, the state focused on developing Hebei and Shandong to
support Zhongdu, but only few resources spent on Henan. Thus after relocation of
capital, the underdeveloped Henan required further development.
In addition, Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River during mid-Jin
Dynasty created serious economic destruction to the state, shown by rise of tax rate
since 1190s. Fortunately the state did not lose any territory so that the economy could
be recovered within years.

Zhangzong implemented mild economic policies to

handle the worsened economic problems. It was a contrast to the economic policy
adopted by Xuanzong after losing northern part of the Central Plain.
Section 1 Economic Development in Zhongdu and Neighboring Regions in Mid
Jin Dynasty (1161-1208)
Historians claimed the Jin Dynasty’s economic development reached the peak during
the two reigns of Shizong and Zhangzong. As early as in the reign of Hailingwang
(Reign: 1150-1161), Jin relocated the capital to Zhongdu (Modern Beijing) and
Nanjing (Modern Kaifeng) respectively. The next emperor Shizong (1161-1189)
returned the capital to Zhongdu. The Central Plains, especially the regions around
Zhongdu, Hebei (Jin’s Hebei, northern side of Yellow River) had extraordinary
economic development. It was explained by well-developed river transportation and
busy business activities.
Hebei’s River Transportation and Granaries
Zhongdu was convenient for transportation. Hailingwang decided to relocate the
capital to Zhongdu because it could easily control the Central Plains.68 Hebei and

68

Both Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu and Old Story of Beijing recorded the story. In Jian Yan Yi Lai
Xi Nian Yao Lu, it recorded that Hailingwang quite admired to the capital set in the Central Plains.
Thus, he planned to relocate the capital. Some suggestions pointed out that Yanjing is the centre of
territory, which could solve the problems of current remote capital. Thus the emperor decided to move
the capital to Yanjing.( Jian Yan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu , 161. P.327-259.) Story of Hailingwang《正
隆事跡》also recorded that officials suggested that Huilingfu 會寧府 of Shangjing was in a remote
area. Officials were hard to send the message while people were difficult to go to capital. Yanshan 燕
山 was a better option as the centre of the world. The emperor accepted the idea and immediately
constructed a capital city in Yanshan. He spent three years to finish it. (Story of Hailingwang; as cited
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Shandong region transported the grains to the capital through river transportation.
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi recorded there were more than ten rivers and canals around Dadu
(modern Beijing, Jin Dynasty’s Zhongdu) connecting neighboring regions in Yuan
Dynasty (1271-1368).69 The waterways mainly passed through northern part of the
Central Plain. 70 For example, taxes collected from Xianzhou and Qingzhou were
transported upstream to Tongzhou, ten more days later arrived to the capital.71 The
cities along the canals set up granaries.72 The river transportation system in Hebei
could transport dozen thousands to over a million piculs of grains to the capital in
short term.73
Moreover, Lugou River development project was implemented in 1170.74 It aimed at
transfering products from southern circuits to the capital to enhance business
activity.75 Unfortunately, the project was not successful.76 Furthermore, to ensure the
smooth transportation of the grains, the government devoted 6000 military laborers
to excavating the canals in 1205.77 It shows that the river transportation in Hebei and
Shandong was crucial to the state’s economy.
Grain Supplies from Manchuria
The state also transported the grains from Manchuria to the Central Plain, where the
place was rich in grains production. Yuan Dynasty’s Gazetteers on Unification
describes that Liaoyang produced different types of grains products.

78

The

in Yu Minzhong (edit), Research on the Old Story of Beijing, 4, p. 60.) Another source, The Record of
Yangwang in the River 《煬王江上錄》 also provided detail information about the pretext of moving
the capital to Yanjing. Liang Hanchen, inner court servant suggested that Yanjing was an ancient
hegemonic place which can supervise The Central Plains, and build up thousand generations of
foundation. (The Record of Yangwang in the River; as cited in Research on the Old Story of Beijing, 4,
p. 59.)
69
Bei Lanxi, etc. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, Chapter 1, Shanghai: Chunghwa Book Store, 1966.
Furthermore, there were several waterways in Hebei and Shandong used for irrigation
and transportation, like Juma River in Bazhou, Sha River in Xiongzhou, Beiqing River in
Shandong. JS, 27, p. 682.
70
JS, 27, p. 684 The canals passed through three metropolitan prefectures (fu) including Daxing,
Daming and Zhangde, 12 prefectures (zhou) and 33 counties (Xian).
71
JS, 27, p. 682
72
JS, 27, p. 682
73
JS, 27, p. 686; JS, 27, p. 683; JS, 27, p. 682, 684
74
JS, 27, p. 686.
75
JS, 27, p. 686.
76
JS, 27, p. 682.
77
JS, 27, p. 648
78
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, 2, pp. 204-205.
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agricultural production in northeast was more than three times of surplus annually.
The excess grains were stored. The accumulated storage in granaries was 2,476,000
piculs.79 The grains storage in Manchuria granaries were not for relief purpose before
1177. 80 Thus there was large amount of storage of grains for these granaries
sufficient for tens of years.
Through the Grand Canal in Shandong, the grains in Liaodong and Beijing (modern
Jinzhou and Inner Mongolia) were transported to Shandong by vessels traveling
through the sea.81 Through the canal, Hebei and the Central Plains could have easily
access to the resources in Northeast if the Central Plain was suffered from starvation.
Business in Hebei and Zhongdu
The busy business activity reflected the flourish economic development. The
increase of commercial tax collected was also strongly related to the economic
growth.
Silk Production Ground and Commercial Activities
Zhongdu had long been a commercial city. Through being Jurchen’s capital for 50
years, the place had growing business activities. Jin Dynasty levied commercial tax
in 1180, and procured huge amount of tax collected. That became a large proportion
of Jin’s tax income. Also, Yuan Dynasty’s Gazetteers on Unification records different
types of silk products that were made in Anzhou of Dadu circuit.82 The trade of high
valued silk product enhanced the commercial activities in the capital as well.
Through the increasingly busy business activity and the raise of commercial tax rate,
the state benefitted from around one third increase in tax income. During the reign of
Dading (1161-1189), Zhongdu gained 164,440 strings of commercial tax annually. In
1196, the annual commercial tax rose to 214,579 strings. 83 There was about 30%
increase of the collected commercial tax. If we exclude the 1 to 2% increase in the
tax rate, there was still around 28 and 29% of increase in commercial tax, which
shows the rapid increase of business activity in Zhongdu.

79

JS, 50, p. 1122 It recorded there were total amount of 205,000 piculs grains tax collected annually in
Shangjing and neighbouring circuits. The annual expenditure was just 66,000 piculs.
80
JS, 7, p. 166.
81
JS, 27, p. 683
82
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, 1, p. 19.
83
JS, 49, p. 1110
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Wine tax was another important source of income to Jin Dynasty’s economy. It was
also a sign of the flourish of business activity in Zhongdu and neighbouring
metropolitan prefectures. Before 1190, wine tax collected in Zhongdu was 361,500
strings annually, and increased to 405,133 strings in 1195, increased 20%. In Xijing,
the original tax collected was 53,467 strings, increased 50% to 107,893 strings in
1195.84 It was directly related to the rapid growth of economy in northern China as
well.
Food Production in Zhongdu
Food supply is important to measure the economy of the place. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi
recorded that grains, fishes, ducks, salt were produced in Baodi (Tianjin) while
grains were grown in Wanping (Xicheng District of modern Beijing) and Changping
(Changping District) near Dadu.85 In addition, Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan
recorded Daxingfu of Yanjing (Zhongdu) had plenty water supply and the land was
fertilized. 86 There was large amount of wet paddy fields. The wet paddy field
benefited from the irrigation system in Zhongdu brought 10,000 hu (5,000 piculs) for
the region annually.87 Furthermore, there was trial implementation of “Quzongfa” or
“Section Planting Method” in the southern region of capital, Hedong and Daizhou.88
It showed that the state devoted its attention in Zhongdu’s agricultural production.
By analyzing the Hebei’s economy before relocation of capital, we can understand
that Hebei and Shandong was the pillar of Jin Dynasty’s economy.
Section 2 Economic Development in Henan in Mid Jin Dynasty
Henan was not the core of Jin Dynasty’s economic development before relocation of
capital. During the discussion of the project on Yellow River, Emperor Zhangzong
(Reign: 1189-1208) had stated that:

The state had long been considering the flooding in Hebei and dams had been
84

JS, 49, p. 1106.
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, Chapter 1, pp. 18-19.
86
Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan, 203, p. 23.
87
JS, 73, p. 2846.
88
JS. 50, pp. 1123-1124.
85
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constructed…Reviewing the entire state, although the region in Shandong is
more important than Henan, all commoners are my son and there should be
no differences among them.89

Zhangzong’s words suggest that Henan was strategically less important than
Shandong before Xuanzong relocated the capital to Henan. At that time, Henan was
in remoted region and its economy was underdeveloped. Zhangzong’s policy of
opening up Henan region stimulated a sharp rise of population in Henan, but its
economy was still far lagged behind compared with Northern Song.The canal
transportation was worse than Northern Song era and also Hebei region. Although
there were large areas of land, just a few people lived there, probably due to the
instable situation of this border region. The poverty of Henan shows that the state
had to put extra resources after relocation of capital.

Song envoy Lou Yue recorded that Henan was still a region of poverty because
Jurchen had confiscated commoner’s properties during Jinkang incident in 1127 and
transferred the treasures to Shangjing, thus there was only little resources left in
Henan.90 Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi also has recorded that all the treasures stored in Bianjing
were taken by Jurchen barbarian.91 The flourish Henan was turned a poor region. Lou
commented that it was not worth for Song to recover this barrened Henan.92 Another
Song envoy who visited Jin one year later also commented that the damaged Kaifeng
had not been recovered until Hailingwang relocated the capital there. The palace was
“beautiful”, but the common area was “barren”. The new city was still ruined. There
was some farmland inside the city. 93 Since Nanjing was the economic centre of
Nanjinglu, or Henan, the ruined Nanjing showed that Henan was devestated during
mid-Jin Dynasty.
Backwarded River Transportation in Henan
Although river and canals transportation in Henan was well developed in Northern
89

JS, 27, p. 678. 向慮河北決，措畫堤防，猶嘗置行省，…自國家觀之，雖山東之地重於河南，
然民皆赤子，何彼此之間。
90
Lou Yue, Bei Xing Ri Lu, in Zhao Yongchun edited, Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu, p. 252
91
Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi, 13, 12.
92
Ibid, p. 253.
93
Fan Chengda, Lan Pei Lu, in Zhao Yongchun edited, Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu, p. 277
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Song, it was obsoleted during mid-Jin Dynasty. In the Treatise of River and Canals
of Jin Shi, the three famous transportation canals around Dongjing (Kaifeng) in
Northern Song, namely Guangji River, Bian River and Huimin River traveling to the
southern region of Henan were not recorded. Henan’s canals was a large contrast to
the the usage and maintenance of Hebei’s canals in mid-Jin Dynasty. Bei Xing Ri Lu
described Henan’s river did not have any maintenance:
The Yellow River breeched its (Southlake) banks in the fifth month of last
year, and there was much damage. The waters of the Yellow River merged
with Southlake, washing away the old road. Brushwood was piled on top of it,
and then straw and dirt in order to give carts and horses access.94
Lou also recorded that the wheat was cultivated in the bottom of Bian River. 95 It
showed part of Bian River was dried up already. Zhou Hui, another Song’s envoy
also witnessed that the Bian River turned shallow. It was blocked in Biankou. He
remembered that in Northern Song, 6,000,000 piculs grains transported from
Yangzhou, passed through Yangtze River and Huai River and Bian River to Kaifeng
within 40 days. 50 years after the fall of Northern Song, he lamented the river
became a drainage. 96 Moreover, Bian River dried up in Lingbi county (Anhui),
region near Suzhou 宿州, 97 the river could not be functioned for transportation
between north and south as the past. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi recorded the name of Bian
River as Bian Canal (汴渠).98 It showed the Bian River turned narrow during Jin
Dynasty. In late Northern Song, Wang Anshi had conducted large scale construction
work in Bian River in winter for the transportation in winter.99 However, the effort
was in vain after Jurchen conquered Henan.
Development in Henan During Zhangzong
During the 40 years peaceful period after the signing of peace settlement with
94

Lou Yue, Translated by Stephen H. West, A Diary of My Journey to the North. Online article <
xirugu.com/Beixing3.pdf> 去歲五月，河決所損甚多。河水今與南湖通，衝斷古路，用柴木橫
迭其上，積草土以行車馬。
95
Lou Yue, Bei Xing Ri Lu, p.253.
96
Zhou Hui, Bei Yuan Lu, in Zhao Yongchun edited, Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu, p. 312
97
Zhou Hui, Bei Yuan Lu, , in Zhao Yongchun edited, Feng Shi Liao Jin Xing Cheng Lu, p. 312
98
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, Chapter 3, p. 238.
99
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi, Chapter 3, p. 239.
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Southern Song in 1164, Jurchen started to encourage people open up Henan. In 1187,
Jin government provided tax exemption and subsidies to encourage refugees to
cultivate several prefectures in the southern border like Tangzhou, Dengzhou,
Yinzhou, Caizhou, Shuzhou, Sizhou and so on. 100 Henan had large amount of
farmland but there was a lack of farmers. Even Hedong (Shanxi) had more
population than Henan. Court officials proposed to cultivate the farmland in Henan
to solve the overcrowded problem and shortage of farms in neighbor circuits.101 At
that time, Henan was benefited from relatively mild climate, (See Appendices) thus
the region started to develop. In 1192, Henan still had 63,520 qing of grazing land
not yet distributed, while neighboring Shanxi Province had 35,680 qing. 102 The open
up policy of Henan region failed. In 1208, the state continued to encourage peasants
to open up barren farmland by exempting the tax from one to three years.103
We could refer to Liu Pujiang’s quotation on the number of households with northern
Song’s data in 1102 and Jin’s data in 1207 from Song Shi and Jin Shi.
Table 1: Comparison on Henan’s Prefectures Between 1102 - 1207
Prefectures Households Households Prefectures Households Households
in 1207

in 1102

in 1207

in 1102

Guidefu

76389

79741

Ruzhou

35254

41587

Shanzhou

65545

61409

Bozhou

60535

130119

Shanzhou

41010

47806

Chenzhou

26145

32064

Dengzhou

24989

114127

Caizhou

36093

98502

Tangzhou

11031

202172

Xizhou

9685

Henanfu

55635

127767

Zhengzhou

45657

55976

Songzhou

26649

Yinzhou

16714

78174

Xuzhou

45587

Suzhou

55058

91483

Junzhou

18510

Sizhou

8092

63632

66041

Source: Liu Pujiang, Study of Jin Dynasty’s Households, History Essays on Liao and
Jin Dynasty, p. 160.
Liu Pujiang comments that the prefectures closed to the border with Song like
100

JS, 47, p. 1048.
JS, 47, p. 1048.
102
JS, 47, p. 1050.
103
JS, 47, p. 1060.
101
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Tangzhou had only 5.5 % of households compared with 100 years ago. The other
border prefectures like Caizhou, Dengzhou and Yinzhou also showed a large contrast
compared with northern Song, with around 15% and 40% differences.104Thus, it was
not surprising to see that Jin’s population growth was caused by the large amount of
immigration. However, the number of households in Henan in 1207, when the state’s
population reached the peak, 105 was still largely inferior to that in northern Song.
Cheng Minsheng comments that the economy of Henan Jin Dynasty’s was not “as
poor as we imagine”.106 But we can see that, however, despite the high growth rate,
most regions in Henan were underdeveloped before the capital had relocated to there.
Henan was still backward when compared with most circuits in the Central Plains.
Section 3: Changing Route of the Yellow River
During mid Jin Dynasty, the state’s river management focused on the northern
riverbank and neglected the south. That caused the Yellow River changed its course
to the south, and later affected Henan region. Jin Shi describes that both Huai and
Yellow River belonged to Jin’s territory after the fall of Liu Yu’s authority. Through
these dozen years, Yellow River sometimes blocked and sometimes flooded, and
changed its route frequently.107Flooding not only destroyed residents’ properties, but
also affected the neighbouring regions. A large number of soldiers and resources
were devoted to flood prevention.108
Jurchen put large amount efforts to monitor and conduct flood prevention project in
Yellow River during the reign of Shizong and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Yellow River
started diverge its route since the flooding occurred in 1168. 60% of water flowed
southward but the state did not intervene the changing of water flow.109 In 1190, the
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state decided to diverge some of water flow to the south. 110 Furthermore, the
construction project of Yellow River allowed Caozhou and Shanzhou to be flooded
but prevent Shandong being flooded in future to minimize labor work111 and not to
affect the farmland and salt field. 112 It showed Jurchen’s economic center was in
Shandong region. The court aimed to reduce its negative effect on northern riverbank.
Under the project, 25 dams were constructed along the river. 6 in the south while 19
in the north. 113 After Zhangzong had determined to take a series of measure to
prevent flooding, then Yellow River had not been flooded in Heshuo region after
1194. (See Appendices)
The reparation work successfully protected the northern part of Yellow River.
However, Yellow River changed to a southern route, limited the territory of Jin
Dynasty after relocation of capital. Li Tianming commented it was the forth changing
route of Yellow River amount history.114 Indeed, the two serious flooding in Henan in
1216 and 1220 was probably related to the changed route of Yellow River. The
pertaining economic problems would be narrated later.
Section 4 Several Economic Features of Mid Jin Dynasty
Jin Dynasty’s economy reached the peak in 1180s and the Jin court reduced the
amount of tax on daily necessity since the middle period of the reign of Dading.
There were a number of scholars, particularly Xie Zhicheng115, Cheng Minsheng116,
Qi Xia and Qiao Youmei, who compares the economic situation in mid Jin
Dynasty.117 They points out that the Jin economy reached the peak during Shizong
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and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Zhang Boquan comments the economy reached the
peak during the reign of Mingchang (1190-1196), but the corruption of state led to
the downturn of economy. 118 Herbert Franke had slightly different opinion. He
comments that “under Shih-tsung, the Chin state was able to maintain itself against
overwhelming odds in later year.” During the reign of Zhangzong, a serious of
natural causes “debilitated the economic foundations of the Chin state.”119 Franke’s
opinion was different from other Chinese scholars. Since the government expenditure
on military reward highly relied on the tax collected on the daily necessity, through
studying the changing tax rate, the economic condition could be analyzed. Jin
Dynasty’s economy was fragile during mid-Jin Dynasty through the tax increase and
other related economic-related policy adopted during Zhangzong reign. At that time,
the state still controlled the entire region of Central Plains and most of region in the
Manchuria and the state income kept stable. Thus, the economy could be recovered.
Flash of Ball Pen of the Flourish Economy
In late 1180s, 25 years before the relocation of capital, Jin Dynasty’s economy
reached the peak, but it lasted less than ten years. It could be reflected in tax
reduction policy. Court official Zheng Yan stated that Jin Dynasty enjoyed long term
peace and controlled large amount of households. The reduction of salt tax just
reduced the state’s annual income of 1,200,000 strings. He also points out that the
storage in the all the granaries had 100,000,000 strings, which was “sufficient for 100
years usage” even if there was deficit in salt tax.120 The actual amount of salt tax
collection reduced 1,854,000 strings. 121 This could provide a contrast to the rapid
deterioration of economy after relocation of capital.
Salt tax rate reduced in 1189. Salt produced from Baodi, Shandong and Cangzhou
reduced from 38 wens per catty to 30 wens. 122 Furthermore, vinegar tax was
exempted in 1183.123 In 1190, the state reduced commercial tax rate totally, reduced
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941,000 strings income. Also the state exempted the tax on renting market.124 Apart
from reduction of commodes tax, in 1189 the state even reduced 10% grain tax for
the whole state. The reduction rate reached 30% for low quality farm.125 The above
tax reduction items on salt and commodes reduced more than 2,700,000 strings
income, which was equivalent to incomes of one third of salt field, or twice amount
of tributes paid from Song.126 At that time, the annual grain tax income was 9 million
piculs.127 Thus the reduction of grain tax probably reduced about one million piculs
grains income.
Background of Tax Rise during the Reign of Zhangzong
Due to the Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River, Jin Dynasty’s
economic status was rapidly deteriated. Jin Shi comments that the military
expenditure was high during the reign of Zhangzong. 128 Toyama Gunji’s research
states that the war with Mongols damaged the economy. Furthermore the state also
had to spend much income on managing Yellow River, which led to the financial
crisis of the state. He analyzes that Zhangzong adopted a more cautious foreign
strategy, especially on handling the Song’s provocation.129 Hearing that Jin was faced
with various internal and external problems, Southern Song attacked Jurchen in
1205.130
Mongolian Invasion and Heavy Labour Work on Yellow River
Since 1192, Jin prepared for the war with Mongols.131 The state increased the armies
in northern border, 132 the battle continued until the winter of 1198. 133 Mongolian
attack increased the expenditure. In 1194, the state mobilized 30,000 extra soldiers
for the war.134 In 1195, the state sent 500,000 taels silver, 236,900 strings coins to
border region for ordinary salary, there was another 50,000 taels of silver, 2,800 taels
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gold bowl, 100 taels of gold medals, 8,000 taels silver medal, 1,000 colorful silk and
446 set clothes were used as award. Xijing, Taiyuan and barbaric tribes was
responsible for transportation of military resources. 135 In 1196, the state offered
another rewards to 20,000 northern soldiers with 200,000 tael of silver, 50,000 bolts
of silk and 320,000 strings cash.136 Different from the war with Song, Jin could not
gain the compensation from Mongols after the war. The properties of the affected
region also largely reduced 20% in Xijing and Beijing. From the property survey
after the war, 66,000 strings property tax income was reduced.137 Also, the defense
construction was heavy.138
In addition, Jurchen put a large number of labour units in dam reparation project
since 1190s. The construction work was commented as “the largest scale amoung
history”, as it involved 200,000 laborers and working 50 days annually within five
years.139
The military conflict with Mongols since 1190s and later with Song, together
with the large scale reparation work on Yellow River created financial burden.
The state adopted several ways to solve the economic problems.

Tax Rise
During mid Jin Dynasty, the state increased tax on salt brought the most significant
effect on the increase of income for the state.140 Although the salt tax was dropped in
1189, it rose shortly in 1195. Salt produced in the three salt fields in the Central Plain
increased 10% to 33 wen.141 In 1199, salt tax in these 3 fields was further increased
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to 42 wens per catty.142 This highly profitable product was to compensate for the
cost. 143 Referred to the table “Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced” (in
Appendices) in the northern salt fields, the price increased from 28% to 67%
respectively. Since 1204, all the seven salt fields increased the salt price to 44 wens
per catty.144 It was a sharp rise of salt tax to Liaodong and Beijing salt fields with the
increase of 3.5 times compared with five years ago. As the economic situation of Jin
Dynasty was getting worse, the government adopted a more strict regulation to crack
down on illegal production and selling of unpaid duty salt since 1206. 145 It also
allowed merchants to export salt to Song since 1208. 146
Furthermore, the vinegar tax was imposed again in 1193 and turned permanently
since 1198 respectively. 147 In 1207, the state increased 1 % of the tax rate on
commerce, gold and silver. Other commodes collected 3%.148 In 1204, commodes tax
increased 1%, including wine tax. In 1207, gold and silver tax increased to 3%.149
The military necessity tax was implemented to increase the income for military
expenditure.150In 1198, the state raised the military necessity tax, as a supplementary
to properties tax which was based on amount of properties. For the Central Plain,
every string of new properties had to pay four strings of tax, for northern and
northeast region the tax was halved.151

Manipulation on Currency
In addition, the state also obtained the money from issuing new currency and issuing
large amount of paper money, mainly for military usage.The state started to issue a
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new silver currency Chengan Baohuo in 1197.152 The purpose of issuing new silver
currency was to procure money for military usage temporary.153 The increased issue
of paper money also had similar function.154 The large amount of paper money issued
led to inflation immediately.155
Tea Ban Implemented
Tea production was largely related to the excess of foreign import trading with
Song. During the reign of Zhangzong, the state implemented a series of policies
to tackle the problems and tried to overtake the income of tea from Song.
In 1198, the state set up office to inhibit import of tea to prevent Song benefited from
tea trading.156 In 1199, Shandong and Henan cultivated tea trees, and sold tea with
600 wens per catty and taxed.157 The tea price soon declined to 300 wens five years
later. 158 In 1208, the ban relived slightly, stipulating that using Xiezhou’s salt in
exchange in order to prevent negative effect on economy. 159 After relocation of
capital, there were even strict ban on tea.
Mongols’ invasion devastated Jurchen’s economy. Fortunately the state still had the
entire Central Plains as buffer. Thus the tax increase was relatively mild and affected
only in short term, which was a large contrast to Xuanzong’s economic policy of
increasing tax sharply. For example, Zhangzong particularly urged that the
implementation on property survey in 1208 should be cautious. Discount for the
newly increased properties tax should be provided, for the interest of state in the
following ten years.160 Probably Zhangzong hoped to prevent the fled of households
by heavy tax which caused greater damage to the economy. Secondly, the state
carefully implemented policy to limit the inflation and prevent the exchange rate of
currency out of control. During Zhangzong reign, despite the inflation, the state
strictly controlled the amount of currency issued.161 In addition, soon after the war
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with Mongols was over, the state immediately terminated the usage of Chengan
Baohuo currency in 1200.162 Furthermore, in 1208 the state even recalled back the
paper money through the means of tax collection. 163 These measures helped the
economy gradually recovered after Mongolian invasion. Another feature was that
Zhangzong implemented several measures to prevent possible disaster, including
exempting peasants’ grains storage under property survey and reducing 20% of
properties tax on farmland.164 Therefore, the state economy could recover in short
term as commoners had sufficient grain storage. However, the storage could not
benefit the state after relocation, probably due to the Mongols’ second invasion.

Five years later Xuanzong also tried to implement similar economic policy
through imposing tax and issuing paper money again, but the state no longer
had enough economic resources. The tax rapidly increased and the economy
was further worsened, and caused serious unfavourable consequences.
In addition, although Weishaowang, Zhangzong’s successor was wicked and
benefited from Zhangzong’s economic policy with large amount of storage in the
Central Plain, the state could continue to relieve drought disaster and starvation in
four circuits of the Central Plain in 1212.165 At that time the state had already faced
Mongols and Xi Xia’s attack and lost large piece of territory. Four years before
relocation of capital, the state could even offer Pingyang earthquake victims 3,000 to
5,000 cash subsidy.166 Starting from 1214 after relocation of capital, the state only
collected large amount of tax from commoners, but there was no more relief after
natural disaster occured. It showed the importance of Zhangzong’s economic policy
and the control of the northern Central Plain to the revival of state.
Section 5 Political and Military Situation of Post Zhangzong era
During the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213), Jin was defeated by Mongols
repeatedly. Mongolian attacked Hebei region since 1209 and the capital started to
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implement martial law.167 In 1211, Genghis Khan commanded his army to invade Jin
and approached Zhongdu region five months later.168 During Jin resisted Mongolian
invasion, in 1213 Weishaowang was assassinated by General Hu Shahu, who failed
to resist Mongols’ attack. Xuanzong then succeeded the throne. Later Hu Shahu was
also assassinated with the same reason by Shuhu Gaoqi who later became the Prime
Minister of Jin Dynasty. Shuhu Gaoqi’s defeat by Mongols may show that late Jin’s
policy of passive defence strategy to Mongols was a complete failure. The attack
from Mongols was increasingly intense. In 1214, most of the regions in Shandong
and Hebei were lost to Mongols. Jin could only control the following prefectures
including Zhendingfu, Damingfu, Qingzhou, Wozhou, Dongping, Xuzhou, Pizhou
and Haizhou. Most of the prefectures and counties in Hedong (Shanxi) were
destroyed.169 Zhongdu implemented commandeering grains policy from commoners.
The emperor allowed people to donate grains to exchange for a post of an official.
Also the capital city enforced martial law. It reflected the tense situation in the
capital. 170 Facing increasing threat from Mongol, Jin signed peace treaty with
Mongols in return for Mongols’ retreat.171
Unrest in Manchuria
On the other hand, the region in Northeast was also highly unrested.172 As early as
Ganghis Khan revolted in 1208, Mongols had already mobilized Yelu Liuge,
adherent of Khitan to jointly attack Jin and occupied Dongjing (Liaoyang). 173
Xuanzong urged Puxian Wannu to garrison in Shenzhou and Guangning 174 for
defense in northeast for future retreat.175 Although Liaodong’s army defeated Yelu
Liuge in 1215, 176 Puxian Wannu’s in Liaodong army soon rebelled against Jin.177
Shenyang, Dongjing and several important prefectures in Manchuria were occupied
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by rebels.178 Cambridge History of China stated that “For the Chin state the loss of
Manchuria, first to Liu-ko and Wan-nu and subsequently to the Mongols, was a
severe blow because it cut off the remains of their state in China from their main
horse-and cattle-breeding areas and from those regions with a substantial Jurchen
population on whose loyalty they could have relied. As the situation was in 1215,
Chin had lost not only the grain surplus -- producing areas of northern Hopei but also
the regions from which they had obtained a great number of their cavalry horses.”179
The situation deteriorated after relocation of capital. The loss of Zhongdu indicated
the termination of connection with Manchuria.
Red Jacket Bandits Unrest in Shandong
Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu recorded that when Mongolian invaders could not took
Zhongdu, Genghis Khan together with the prince attacked Hebei and Shandong
region. They attacked a number of prefectures including Hejiangfu, Cangzhou, Jinan,
and so on. 180 Red Jacket Bandits or Song’s loyal and righteous armies, followed
Mongolian invaders to attack Shandong. 181 Since then, Shandong became highly
unstable.182 The rose of Red Jacket Bandit could be traced back to Han Tuozou’s
invasion in 1207, which Song’s authority stirred up Heshuo’s commoners rebel Jin.
Despite the failure of Han’s northern expedition, once there was a disaster, bandits
rose immediately.183 Groups of rascals robbed the region.184 For example, Li Quan,
bandit leader had provided military aid in Song’s northern expedition in 1207.185
Yang An’er, with originally about one thousand bandits, rebelled after Mongols’
attack.186 Shandong rapidly turned into chaos.187
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Chapter 1 Relocation of Capital to Nanjing and the Situation of Heshuo
after Relocation of Capital
In 1214, the capital had been besieged by Mongols forces. Neighboring prefectures
were destroyed. Grains in Zhongdu were almost used up.188 Also generals refused to
accept military order because soldiers were spoiled by the precedent emperor
Weishaowang.189 In addition, the Central Plains suffered from serious natural disaster
from 1211 to 1214, leading to the sharp rise in grains price.190 That in turn stimulated
a discussion on relocating the capital.
Under the military threat from Mongols, Jurchen still kept several regions which
were potentially the location of the new capital. After relocation of capital, Jin
focused the defence on the sphere of Nanjing but ignored other regions, which
eventually caused the loss of Heshuo again and rose of bandits.
Section 1 Debating about Relocation of Capital
Both the unrests in northeast and eastern part of the Central Plain shared a
common feature: the rebellion force cooperated with Mongols to strengthen
their power. Zhongdu was still under military threat. Furthermore, the state
could not receive the grains supply backup from these two unrested
regions.After Mongols invaders retreated, Hebei was destroyed. A number of
officials suggested relocating the capital. There was a heated debate on whether
moving the capital, and where the new capital should be located.
Opinion 1: Relocate the Capital to Shandong
Zhao Bingwen suggested that relocating the capital to Shandong because China did
not have natural barrier in the north. Shandong was wealthy and convenience as it
located in near Zhongdu. Through sea transportation it could get to Liaodong and
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kept connecting Shangjing. 191 In addition, Shandong could made use of river as
natural barrier, and the concrete of the walled city and it was far away from the
barbarians (Mongols).192
Opinion 2: Relocate the Capital to Hezhong (Shanxi)
Some court official suggested moving the capital to Hezhong region to strengthen the
defence for the reason that it was closed to the five provinces near the passes. Also
there were plenty of soldiers and horses. Furthermore, it had the barrier of Yellow
River and three military towns in Hezhong, like Jiangyang, Pingyang and Taiyuan.
Thus enemies could not easily attack. However, the dominant opinion in the court
rejected the suggestion because it was located in Heshuo region and there was no
palace there.193 It revealed that the court’s defense strategy largely depended on the
natural barrier of Yellow River.
Opinion 3: Relocate to Nanjing (Kaifeng)
Furthermore, there were more officials who suggested moving the capital to Henan.
Wanyan Bi, high ranking general suggested that there should be well-prepared for the
planning of defence under the cease-fire agreement with Mongols, and consider
relocate the capital to prevent the people suffering economic burden if Mongols
invade again.194 He urged the emperor to move the capital to Nanjing, which can
monitor the Yangtze River and Huai and hence defend the Yellow River. Also it could
control Tongguan to strengthen the defence. 195 Later, three high ranking Henan
officials sent a proposal to emperor to urge for moving the capital to the Nanjing
thrice. Xuanzong then accepted their proposal.196 The relocation of capital revealed
that the state’s economy and security were fragile as it was geographically too close
to Mongols. However, Natan Moujia opposed that idea because of the insufficient
land and the lack of fertility in Henan. Also, it might risk the joint attack from Song
and Xi Xia, and then Hebei would loss.197 He suggested dozens thousands soldiers
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should fight with Mongol. 198 Furthermore, there were four hundred university
students who urged Xuanzong not to relocate the capital. However, their petition was
rejected.199
Section 2 Analysis on Policy on Heshuo Region after Relocation of capital
Zhangzong had commented that the capital was the rite of the world. 200 The place of
capital setting was critical for the development of the state. The setting of capital is
highly related to the economic development and even the fate of dynasty. The grain
supply was an important consideration, together with the transportation of grains
from neighbouring regions to the capital. It could be demonstrated through the
policies adopted by Jin after relocation of capital. Shi Nianhai analysed the criteria
for establishing capitals, including natural environment like climate, terrain,
agricultural products and rivers together with economic factors, like population,
agricultural production, and grain transportation. 201 Thus, the relocation of capital
was an important issue for the interest of the state. The military aspect was important,
but it could not ignore the economic aspect.
Loss of Zhongdu and Heshuo Destroyed
After moving the capital to Nanjing, The mission of Zhongdu’s canals to transport
the grains from Damingfu through Yu River to Tongzhou for Jin Dynasty
completed. 202 When the Mongols attacked Jin again, prefectures along the canals
were under military risk, which led to the starvation in Heshuo. Also, Henan and
Shanxi was too far to support Zhongdu. The emperor soon recalled the Imperial
Prince to Nanjing for defending Zhongdu.203 Before the fall of Zhongdu, Jurchen had
tried to dispatch troops to relieve Zhongdu with grains204 but the garrison forces of
the city surrendered and the grains could not reach the capital, thus people in
Zhongdu resorted to cannabalism, and generals were fled. 205 Later, the court also
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refused to assist Zhongdu to prevent the loss of imperial troops. Thus Zhongdu was
fallen.206 During the middle period of the reign of Xuanzong, the state’s policy was
mainly defense, particularly in Henan and Shanxi region, due to the lack of power
and Heshuo’s cities were destroyed.207 In 1217 Xuanzong claimed that he wanted to
return to the capital to Zhongdu.208 This was just a good wish of Xuanzong. Even if
the state would offer Prince Title for those local and loyalist generals who could
recover Zhongdu,209 none could meet this target. Until 1218, Jin court continued to
discuss the matter and aimed at connecting Manchuria region,210 but there was no
any concrete plan.
Mongols destroyed the entire Heshuo. They massacred all the inhabitants after
capturing the city. All the treasures were confiscated. 211 They captured all the
resources once attacked a place.212 After relocation of capital, under the ruling from
Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi, Jurchen did not have the plan to recover the lost
land.213 Heshuo region left disrepair. In addition, Heshuo’s local officials planned to
flee.214 Local prefectures and counties governors also fled to Henan.215 Furthermore,
the state encouraged commoners to relocate to Henan,216 and later inhibit the new
immigrants to return their Heshuo hometown. 217 Cities there were implemented
scorched earth policy,218 destroyed and burned everything, and retreated immediately.
That in turn led to over 70% of grains damaged and therefore the anxiety of
inhabitants. The military households lost their job as they abandoned their properties.
Also the local people were also disturbed. 219 For example, both soldiers and
commoners in Hejianfu were ordered to move to Qingzhou for grains as it had
become an isolated city. 220 Zhangdefu (Anyang) was also abandoned by military
generals.

Xuanzong agreed with the move as it was meaningless to defend a
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indefensible city. 221 Furthermore, the picked troops garrisoning in Heshuo had to
assist Nanjing,222 which in turn undermined the defence of Heshuo region. Soon after
the relocation of capital, Hebei already became ruined.223 Censor Xu Gu pointed out
the retreat of military households affected the recovery plan of Heshuo region.224 The
rapid retreat of armies in Heshuo and gave up the cities caused the raise of bandits
and serious shortage of grains for loyalist army garrisoning in Hebei and Shandong
region.
Conferring Duke Title to Loyalist for Protection in Heshuo
Despite the fact that Jin gave up the territory in Hebei and Shandong region, there
were nine major local powers attempted to recover the lost land and prefectures. Wu
Xian, loyalist of Zhending and Zhang Kai, loyalist of Qingzhou had the strongest
financial and military power.225 At the beginning, the state continued to reward local
power with 2,000,000 strings in order to eliminate Red Jacket Bandits.226 But of the
lack of income, the state could only conferred loyalists high ranking of knight title,
with full special rights.227 In 1216, the state decided to follow the footstep of Song by
conferring official title to Li Quan, the head of Red Jacket Bandit, 228 and high
ranking knights to Jin Dynasty’s loyalists. 229 These nine Dukes provided military
service to the state, and acted as buffer of Henan. These nine Dukes were de facto
warlords.They had high degree of autonomy, such as tax collection, laws
implementation and recruitment of officials. 230 Sometimes they even requested
grains from the central government. Also they had discretion of make military
decisions and whether accepting government’s order or not. Local officials were in
no position to affect the warlord’s decision. 231 Although these loyalists offered
voluntary military service to the state, the state reluctantly support them both in
terms of finance and armies. The state also had no intention to improve the water
transportation in Heshuo region for easier access of grains. Loyalist Zhang Kai
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garrisoned in Hebei, and urged for improving the river transportation in Anyang but
rejected.232 Eventually there was a lack of grain supplies for his army. In addition, the
limitation of grains supply in Heshuo also affected the grains supply to army
garrisoned there. In 1214, the garrison forces in Heshuo region did not have enough
grains support. For instance, Tian Zuo’s army were 2,500 people in size. They did
not receive enough salaries, even though it was at the expense of commoner’s food
supplies. 233 Also, the court hardly assisted Heshuo’s loyalist, with the excuse of
insufficient Henan soldiers. 234 Thus, the achievement of loyalists was extremely
limited. Later Wu Xian and Zhang Kai lost and surrendered to Mongols and Red
Jacket Bandits respectively.
Increased Intensity to Plunder Heshuo’s Resources
In addition, the state set up various measures to grab the wealth from
commoners in Heshuo. That caused serious starvation in the affected region.
A year after the state relocated to Nanjing, the state implemented policy to collect
80% tax of the transportation of grains from Henan to Heshuo through setting up
customs along the Yellow River.235 Commoners, soldiers and even travelers could not
directly transfer grains to Heshuo.

236

In addition, Xuanzong noticed Hebei’s

commoners had large amount of cash.

237

Thus, the court decided to strictly limit the

grains supply to the region to increase the price of grains and obtain the money
there.238 The policy led to the price of grains in Guanzhou and Cangzhou sharply
rose to 10 tael of silver, and people resorted to cannabalism in 1216. 239 Also,
merchants could not gain benefit and did not transport the grains there. That led to
starvation in Heshuo in the same year.240 In 1217, Xuanzong allowed to reduce the
taxation, by just collecting half amount of grains transferring to Heshuo. 241However,
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it could not solve the problem of lack of available grains in Hebei in 1220. 242
Xuanzong’s policy caused hard lifestyle to people who stayed in Heshuo, thus
increasing people joined the bandits to against Jin.
Economic Loss of Losing Heshuo Region
Hebei and Shandong were rich in resources. These regions did not only
produced silk, but also the production ground of rare metal and salt which could
yield large amount of tax income. The reduced territory decreased the financial
income of the state.
Loss of Silver Supply
After Zhongdu fall, Jurchen lost all the silver mine. Treatises of Food and Commodes
described since 1165 the state ordered Baoshan County to conduct silver mining to
encourage the mining.243 During 1189-1208, the state opened up 113 of silver mine
in Fengshan and Xiyinshan near Zhongdu.244 Treatise of Geography also provided
that Daxing fu (modern Beijing) produce gold, silver, copper and iron. 245 Yuan Yi
Tong Zhi also recorded that silver and iron were produced in Wanping County of
Dadu.246 It revealed that both Hebei and Zhongdu were the major silver production
regions.
Furthermore, Song stopped paying tribute to Jin also terminated the import of silver.
It seriously affected the state’s ability to reward the armies and officials. Chief
Chancellor Desheng pointed out silk and silver used to reward soldiers. 247 Part of
soldiers’ salaries of was paid with cash as well. Thus, Jin Dynasty attempted to get
back some of silver and financial support to the state, at the expense of peaceful
relationships with the Southern Song.
It could be proved that the lack of silver production in Henan affected Jin’s market
trading. In 1215, there was a debate on using silver as currency on the cross-border
market and collecting the tax directly from it. Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi pointed
out that the ban of silver should be continued in border market, for the reason that
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there was no silver mine within territoty after Mongols invasion and it could prevent
further loss of silver.248 This source clearly pointed out that Jin did not have enough
storage of silver after relocation of capitaland no longer be able to produce silver as
the silver mining was not in the territory of the state. During Mid Jin Dynasty, silver
was the major source of currency while coins were only limited supply. Kato Shige
stated that Jin did not have the production ground of copper which was produced in
Jiangnan region. Thus it had to use silver as currency instead, and paper money was
used as supplementary.249 Therefore, after relocation of capital and losing silver, the
rapid drop of the supply of rare metal and resources, seriously damaged the
economic structure of state. The prohibitation of the use of coins caused the rapid
devaluation of paper money. That would be discussed in chapter 2
Losing Baodi and Manchuria’s Salt Income
During peaceful period, salt tax income was the most important and stable tax
incomes of the state, as shown in the table “Income of Salt Tax in Different Places”
listed in Appendices. After relocation of capital, Jin lost control to northeast and
Zhongdu region, the loss of households and population reduced the state’s income
from salt tax. First of all, the salt tax from Baodi supplying Zhongdu circuit,
Liaodong, Beijing (Inner Mongolia) and Xijing (Datong) supplying northern and
northeast regions lost. lossing 2,352,224 strings based on calculation of Jin Shi
data.250 On the other hand, Jin also lost Shandong to Red Jacket Bandits, further
losing Shandong and Cangzhou salt fields which could yield 4,334,184 strings and
2,766,636 strings respectively. Jin only kept Xiezhou salt field and sent soldiers to
protect this salt field.251 The huge loss of salt tax had to be compensated by other
means.
Jin Dynasty abandoned the territory in Hebei, just like providing the resources
for enemies to attack back, enhanced expanding Mongols’ power. In 1230,
Mongols Prime Minister Yelu reported to emperor that
Your Majesty will have Southern Expedition. All the military cost came from
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the Central Plains’ tax income, like land tax, commercial tax, salt, wine, mining,
and the benefit from mountain and lakes. The government can gain 500,000
taels silver, 80,000 bolts of silk and 400,000 piculs of grains for every year. This
is plenty for supporting the army.252
The above data showed Mongols conquered the northern part of the Central
Plain, they could gain this amount of tax, already enough to support its southern
expedition armies.
Loss of Wealth After Relocation of Capital
The loss of Zhongdu meant all the important storage of Jin Dynasty was lost, it was
due to the relocation of capital was too sudden. Xu Gu commented that after losing
Zhongdu, treasures stored more than hundred years were all lost.253 Song also noted
that Jurchen left lots of treasures in Hebei.254 When Mongols overtook Zhongdu, the
treasures in the palace originally owned by Jin were confiscated. 255 Mongols General
Samohe could sleep in golden bed and wore gold made shoes.256
Furthermore, the grains storage was also lost. During mid-Jin Dynasty, when
Zhangzong started the war with Mongol in 1194, there were still large amount of
storage. Official reported that the state had 33,430,000 strings equivalent to two
years expenditure, while all the 519 granaries stored 37,863,000 piculs of corns,
which was sufficient for five years of expenditure of officials and soldiers. The rice
storage was 8,100,000 piculs which was equal to four years of expenditure.257 After
the loss of Heshuo’s territory and the intensity of wars with neighbouring regions,
probably most of the storage used up or lost to Mongols through the loss of wars.
Mongols used to drink milk and ate goats for their diet during their invasion, once
they captured some cities in China they started to eat grains and rice as meal.258 After
conquering the Central Plain, the Mongols obtained a stable source of grain supplies
to provision their forces.
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Chapter 2 The Development in Henan and its Economic Problems
After the Mongols’ invasion and the relocation of capital, the economic status
between Hebei and Henan shifted. In 1215, Gao Ruli commented that after Mongols’
invasion, lots of people died or fled away from Hebei and the economy and
agriculture was seriously destroyed. On the other hand, after the emperor moved to
Henan, it attracted lots of commoners to migrate there, and cultivated the virgin
land.259 However, commoners did not feel secured after they moved to Nanjing. Liu
Qi recorded that despite Nanjing was flourishing, it consistently had demons. 260
According to Yuan Haowen, “There must have propitious sign for a raising state, and
there must have demons for falling state.”261 It is difficult to prove whether it had
demons in Nanjing at that time, but it is sure that people did not have the sense of
security, and they might think that it’s the sign of the fall of dynasty. In addition, Jin
Dynasty put lots of manpower to defend Nanjing since there was no alternative place
to flee. After Jin Dynasty moved to Nanjing, censor Wanyan Sulan urged the emperor
to be more careful and should not make the same mistake again. 262 However, the
short sighted economic policy of the government after relocation of capital led to the
doom of Jin Dynasty.
Section 1 Migration and Immigrant Policies
A. Relocating the Armies to Nanjing
Jin Dynasty adopted a passive defend strategy after relocation of capital, and the
armies retreated from Hebei to Henan. It not only affected the defense in Hebei, but
also affected the economy in Henan. In the first stage, three hundred thousand
soldiers originally garrisoned in Hebei relocated to Henan. The state ordered to
preserve the power of army to protect Nanjing.263 The huge number of soldiers
also burdened food supply. Despite the fact that some officials and even the
emperor himself suggested it may be better for the army to garrison in the northern
side of the Yellow River, Shuhu Gaoqi opposed the idea of protecting Hebei. In 1216,
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around a million soldiers were in the state with their relatives receiving subsidy.264
All these measures after relocation of capital created heavy economic burden for the
state.

B. Transferring the Relatives of Military Households to Henan
Under the state policy, the relatives of military households were also forced to
transfer to Henan. They had to abandon all their properties. According to Gao Ruli,
the drawbacks include the abandon of the household’s farm and land, the difficulty of
transfer, and rumours that would possibly lead to the instability of the society.265
Feng Bi criticized the rush implementation of policy of retreat and migration created
chaos and disturbances.266 The flowing population thus heavily burdened Henan and
its economy.

C. Transferring Commoners to Henan
A lot of commoners fled to Henan, but could not settle for farming due to the
shortage of farmlands. Neither were they allowed to return. Thus, a number of
commoners suffered from starvation.
Jin Dynasty immediately let the population to migrate into Henan after ceasefire with
the Mongolss.267 In the following year, the state also urged local officials accept all
commoners from Hebei to migrate to Henan and provided aid to them.268 Some of
Heshuo people were recruited to the army. For example, 10,000 Xijing (Datong)
refugees who moved to Henan were enrolled in army.269 The policy continued till
1221 when the entire Hebei and Shandong region were almost lost. Moreover, most
loyalists retreated to Henan due to serious starvation.270
Apart from the above measures, the state also strongly encouraged the officials to
accept more immigrants. For example, the officials who originally defected to
Mongols and returned were allowed to be re-admitted in order to welcome all people
to move to Henan. 271 At the same time, the state rewarded to local officials who
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could encourage immigration and increase the number of households. 272 Moreover, Ji
Wenlong relocated to Dengzhou region to escape from battlefield and moved to
Southern Song later.273
Wu Songdi’s research pointed out that most people moved from Hebei and Zhongdu,
and some from Shanxi and they were mainly moved to Henan, and little of them
moved to Shandong.274 He also proved that there were around three to four million
people, including military households and commoners moved to Henan.275
The state attempted to transfer the population, but there were not sufficient farmlands
because the state put the priority to distribute lands to military households. For
example, Song Zizheng migrated to Henan during the reign of Zhenyou (1213-1217),
but returned due to insufficient spaces.276 Certain amount of military was not
distributed farmlands, let alone commoners without properties.
To prevent spy, Jin Dynasty banned commoners from southern bank of Yellow River
to their Heshuo hometown since 1215. 277 Wang Yi moved from Hebei to Henan
during the reign of Zhenyou. However, he could not sustain his life. He planned to
move to Linzhou to farm where the place had been fallen to Mongols. Wang was
sentenced to death for treason.278 People were not dared to go back their hometown
after they moved to Henan even if financially they could not support themselves. It
partly explained the rise of bandit.
Immediate Effects on Relocating Population to Henan
Large amount of immigrants and commandeering of grains caused inflation. Since
1214, as people from other provinces all gathering in Henan to buy, there was a sharp
rise of grain’s price on the way the emperor Xuanzong travelling to Nanjing. Gao
Ruli stated it was due to too many paper money issued and not enough grains
available in market. He suggested encouraging commoners to contribute the
grains.
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Thus, the state implemented the first commandeering of grains

272

JS, 14, p. 310.
Su Tianjue, Zi Xi Wen Gao, 14, p. 219.
274
Wu Songdi, Chinese Migration History, p. 157.
275
Wu Songdi, Chinese Migration History, p. 156.
276
Su Tianjue, Guo Chao Ming Chen Shi Lue, p. 205.
277
JS, 15, p. 339
278
Yuan Haowen Quan Ji, 19, p. 510.
279
JS, 107, p. 2353
273

44

immediately after relocating the capital to Nanjing in that year.280 Xu Gu stated the
problems of garrisoning heavy armies in the capital affected the food storage of
commoners.

281

To support the state’s extra expenditure on subsidizing military

households, Gao Ruli suggested that double tax collected apart from ordinary tax.282
As people were starving, they had to eat rubber or even exchange their children for
diet. 283 In addition, for commoners who moved to Henan under the policy of
relocation, lots of them became jobless. Some even turned into bandits and created
instability. The state probably intended to increase the manpower for farming, to
contribute for tax, but there was not enough available farmlands for commoners, the
jobless peasants turned bandits later further created trouble for the state.
Section 2 Cost on Development on the Underdeveloped Henan
As previously described, Henan was underdeveloped during mid Jin. After
relocation of capital, most Jurchen and some commoners from Hebei were
migrated to Henan. The state gave up Hebei and Shandong and devoted more
resources to opening up Henan, including open up barren land for farming,
develop wet paddy field, water transportation system and construct defense unit
in Henan. However, the economic achievement could not cover up the
development cost, and could not reach the consumption from the large amount
of new immigrant.
Open up barren land
After relocation of capital, large amount of new immigrants arrived Henan. As most
of high quality farmland were occupied, there were only grazing land, which was
barren for long time and difficult to be cultivated. They did not have cattle and
farming tools as well. 284 Thus the state suspended the policy and continued to
provide them grains subsidy. 285 Gao Ruli also pointed out soldiers could not earn
much from the distributed land and impossible to confiscate commoner’s land as
280
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they had to pay triple tax together with heavy labour work. 286 In addition, once
commoners finished farming, they had to provide labour and transportation services.
Thus they did not have spare resources to open up more farmland for military
households. 287 Eventually, the court decided to encourage commoners to cultivate
official barren land, and have of the reward was owned by them, the other half would
turned into military households.288 Until 1220, six years after relocation of capital,
some of military households still not yet distributed farmlands. 289 The policy of
distributing farmlands to military households affected the livelihood of commoners
who rented the official lands. Half of farmlands in Henan were state owned land, and
there were large amount of Henan’s commoners renting state owned farmland. Since
1215, the tax was heavy for peasants for those years. Peasants would no longer rent
the official farmland and reluctantly handover the land to army if there were further
increase on the tax.290 The policy led to increasing amount of commoners fled.
Implementation of Wet Paddy Field
In addition, the state tried to promote wet paddy field in Henan for higher yield since
1208. In Pizhou and Qizhou, 600 qin of land was cultivated, and the harvest was
several times than ordinary farm.291
In 1216, Cheng Yuan proposed to implement wet paddy field in Xishan County to
collect 100,000 piculs tax by collecting one third from harvest. In 1221, Li Guorui,
Nanyang governor reported that the place had opened more than 400 qin of farmland.
292

Originally, the tax was three times higher than the ordinary agricultural tax which

collected one tenth of income, but later the state decided to widely promote this
policy to Shanxi, and the tax was the same as land field. 293 In 1222, wet paddy field
was further promoted to whole Henan region.294
Discussion on Diverging Yellow River To Solve Land Crisis
The serious shortage of available farmlands forced the court to consider
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diverging the Yellow River to flow in a northern route, which was an original
route after the capital moved the Nanjing for military strategy.
Before Jin decided to move the capital, Zhao Bingwen suggested changing the route
of river for defense. He suggested that reviewing Northern Song, Yellow River
passed Hebei and Shandong, joining other rivers to the sea. The contemporary
Yellow River flowed in southern way through Xuzhou, Pizhou. It was easy to diverge
the route of river through small scale of construction then the river could follow the
original path and merged Shandong and Henan together. Even if enemy invades, the
natural barrier can block them.” 295 In 1215, the following year after relocated to
Nanjing, the court raised a debate on whether diverging Yellow River to the north.
Yanzhan Tianze, governor of Shanzhou commented that it should make use of
present’s dam to let the Yellow River flow in northern way as defensive strategy. The
land originally covered by river would be turned into fertile land and could yield
double the harvest. Otherwise, there would not be enough grain supply for soldiers in
Henan, and the state would loss the population in Hebei and Shandong. 296 Another
Henan official Wensan Kexi of Yanzhou governor also suggested diverge the Yellow
River to original route to increase the territory of Henan. He pointed out after the
project, prefectures in Shandong and Damingfu would belong to Henan. Furthermore,
there were half of prefectures in Hebei could be gained, for the defensive purpose
and the foundation of recovering the state. 297 This proposal was rejected by court
officials, arguing that the route of river was difficult to control and defend. 298
However, through the discussion we could understand the serious shortage of lands
and resources in Henan, due to the state gave up Heshuo region, and too obsessive to
rely on the natural barrier of Yellow River.
Development of Henan’s River and Canal Transport
As analysed in previous chapter, river transportation was not common in Henan
because Henan was a relatively poverty region during middle of Dynasty, Hebei’s
river transportation was more important than Henan to transfer the grains to the
capital. At the moment of relocation of capital, the river transportation in Henan was
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not well developed. There was lack of vessels in the river for transportation, 299 and
even assisted by land transportation like cow and carts instead.300
After moving the capital to the south, Henan’s river transportation became
increasingly important for transportation of grains from Shanxi. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi
recorded in 1214, Jin Dynasty diverge Jinshui River to Nanjing city. 301 However, the
scale was largely smaller than Northern Song era and also Zhongdu. The
transportation of grains from Shanxi to Henan had been using land transport. There
were mountainous areas in Hedong when the grains transferred from Shanxi to
Henan,302 transporting 100,000 piculs grains annually to Nanjing.303 To increase the
efficient of transporting grains from Shanxi to Henan, vessels were used although it
risked Mongols’ attack to travel through Yellow River.304
In 1223, the state followed to the past experience of Hebei’s canals and set up a
granary in Guidefu to support the prefectures in eastern region. 305 Large vessels
started to be built in the same year to increase the efficient and reduce the amount of
labours. It could transfer 350 hu grains by each vessel, transferring 7000 hu by only
using 100 sailors in few days to eastern region. 306 At the same time, granary was set
up in Biling County, through the use of a newly constructed canal to transfer grains
from Wangan Lake to Bianjing and Sizhou for grains storage.307
The grains supply for Henan took a higher priority than Hezhong or Shanxi region.
Once there was deficient of grains in Henan, Shanxi immediately offered supply to
the region.308On the other hand, even if there was starvation in Xiezhou, the customs
in Shanxi and Hezhong did not allow the grains to transport to support Xiezhou.309
People suffered from starvation and the granaries were emptied.310 Compared with
the canals transportation around Zhongdu before relocation of capital, Shanxi’s river
transportation’s scale was much smaller and lagged behind.
Furthermore, the loss of Heshuo region even put river transportation was under threat
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by Mongols invaders. In 1220, the emperor urged the prince to ensure the safety of
transferring the grains from Zhongjing (Luoyang), the vessel had to be decorated as
if transferring armies to deceive the enemy.311 Also, the vessels were ported in the
southern riverbank if there was any military alarm.312 Quan Hansheng pointed out
that the Grand Canals original used to connect Yangtze River and Yellow River. The
confrontation between Song and Jin terminated this several hundred years’ old north
and south transportation pathway. It no longer link up the military base and
weakened the economic centre. The dispersal of power was not powerful to against
the later rising nomadic Mongolian ethnics. 313 After relocating the capital, Henan
could merely provide sufficient resources to defend to Mongols and neighbouring
three forces, but the southern expedition terminated the Jin and Southern Song to
exchange for materials, including grains and other major necessity.
Construction for Defensive Building
After relocation of capital, the state aimed at retaining the sovereignty by
keeping Henan, thus Jurchen decided to enhance the defence. However, it did
not only consume much manpower without considering the affordability of the
state, but also overly abused the commoners in Henan, which affected the
agricultural production.
Jin had spent lots of resources for constructing inner city, aimed at strengthened the
defence. Shuhu Gaoqi claimed that Nanjing city having 80 square li was so large that
was not easy to defence. Thus an inner city of Nanjing city wall with 40 square li was
proposed to construct. 314 In summer 1219, the state started to construct the inner
city.315 The construction last for more than half a year until winter.316 The working
progress delayed, seriously affected the agricultural production and even the storage
in the granaries. 317 Lots of houses were destroyed. 318 The delay of work progress
eventually increased the labours up to 100,000. During autumn, large amount of

311

JS, 27, p. 685
JS, 27, p. 685
313
Quan Hansheng, Transportation Canals and Tang Song Emperor, P. 123.
314
Gui Qian Zhi, 7, p. 68
315
JS, 15, p. 344.
316
JS, 15, p. 347.
317
JS, 15, p. 3468.
318
Gui Qian Zhi, 7, p. 68
312

49

workers were infected. 319 After the project finished, the state offered subsidy to
commoners for four months.320 As the construction undermined the productivity of
Henan, the emperor Xuanzong knew the influence of construction work upon the
economy of commoners, and eventually loss of the sense of security. 321 During the
falling Jurchen in 1230s, Mongols’ forces entered Henan. The court decided to
defend the outer city. However, the Mongols captured the outer wall, and no one
could escape. 322 Liu Qi commented that the strong outer city was constructed by
Song. He criticized the stupid idea to build inner wall of Nanjing that when Mongols
attacked, Jin Dynasty could not give up the other wall, so the inner city is useless.323
In fact, the defensive ability of inner wall could not be tested, as the fall of city was
due to starvation after being besieged by Mongols.
In late Jin Dynasty, the state also put lots of effort to construct military unit. In 1224,
the state constructed Zhongjing city (Luoyang). 324 In 1225, the state spent several
million labour units to construct military department office of Guide metropolitan
prefecture (Shangqiu). Later the state only reduced one third of labour work.325 The
intense labour work affected the productivity of commoners.
Jin relocated the capital to the poverty Henan where the place developed too late,
increased the burden of development expenditure. Despite the state put lots of
effort to develop, the expenditure was even higher and there was no surplus for
the state.
Section 3 Economic Burden Created by Relocation of Military Households
The state provided large amount of subsidizes to military households once they
relocated to Henan. The purpose was to enhance their loyalty, which may also
compensate their properties loss in Hebei region. It could be known through
Xuanzong’s suggested that grains must be provided to military households to award
them for their contribution to defend Mongols invaders. Either farmlands or grains
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were supplied to them.326 In 1218, Zhang Xinxin described the state providing whole
family of every soldier subsidy aimed at enhancing their loyalty, but created the
burden of the state. He even pointed out the problems that some military households
without man but still received subsidies.327 It showed the state waste lots of resources.
After the government implementing the law of commandeering grains, all family
members of a soldier would be subsidized to enhance the unity of soldiers. Also all
of their family members were allowed to enter the capital. However, after several
years they did not have enough to eat.328 Since 1222, the state implemented measures
for military households in seven Henan’s prefectures, including Zhongjing
(Luoyang), Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shangzhou, Xuzhou, etc. to move to Jingzhaofu
(Xian) and prefectures nearby to eat. 329 It was probably Tangzhou and Dengzhou
lack of grains supply after the failure of southern expedition. The farmlands
distributed were far away, some were even several hundred li away from where they
were garrisoned. Military Department commented it was not convenient for military
households to farm themselves, so they had to hire someone to farm, and collect the
rents in several hundred miles apart. 330 Thus the state suspended the policy about
distribution of farmland to military households. 331 It showed the drawback of
relocating all the military households. Too much people received subsidizes from the
state, spent up most of the grains of the storage in Henan and created economic.
Later, the loss of Shanxi and Hezhong eventually further imposed burden on Henan.
In 1331, the state relocated population from Jingzhaofu (Xian) to Henan before the
place was attacked by Mongols. 332 The loss of Jingzhaofu and the return of the
population created the burden of grains supply of Henan again.
Subsidizes to Military Households
The state consumed large amount of grains to Jurchen military households. At the
early stage, there was a larger amount of subsidy provided to military households. In
1215, there were few millions population of military households fled to Henan.333
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The government supplied every people with one litre of rice daily. The annual
expenditure on this is 3,600,000 piculs. Half of the amount paid by cash money, it
also need to pay 3,000,000 picul grains. In Henan, 240,000 qing (24,000,000 mu) of
land was lent, while the income of rent was only 1,560,000 piculs. Therefore the
emperor ordered officials to distribute barren land and grazing land, which could be
cultivated to military households, with everyone 30 mou.334
The regulation of monthly salary of ordinary soldiers before relocation of capital was
one picul and seven pecks to seven pecks, depended on different types of soldiers.335
The salary was provided per person. In addition, military households had to pay
small amount of tax. It was different from the situation after relocation of capital the
salary was provided for every family member, including elderly and child. Base on
the average of 7.8 populations of every military household,336 with daily one liter of
grains supply, the monthly salary for every household is 2 piculs and 3 pecks, which
is 2-3 times higher than before. The military farm policy was not popular to some of
military households. Some military households used to have corrupted lifestyle.
Before relocation of capital, they drank whole day but not farm.337 Some also lend
the farmland to others because they addicted to wine but cannot farm.338 Emperor
tried to inhibit their practice but not success. Thus some military households did not
farm. When the state planned to distribute farmlands to them to replace subsidy and
consulted them, their respond was to reduce half of subsidy rather than distribute
them farmland. 339 Some particularly worried that the implementation of military
farming would affect their subsidy, thus Xuzhou and Suzhou armies particularly
rejected this policy.340 In fact, before Jin conquered the Central Plains, every soldier
had to farm without exception.341 However, their lifestyle turned corrupt and it was
difficult for them to farm, particularly on the uncultivated land.Thus, the state
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continued to provide them subsidy, half by grains and half by money. 342 In 1216, the
court’s report that there were 448,000 populations under military household still
receiving the grains subsidy.343 Assume that they received the minimum subsidy, that
every people obtain just one liter of grains daily, the annual expenditure of the state
was 1,635,200 piculs, which used up large proportion of income of the state.
There was increasing demands from court and military officials, proposed the
implement military farming policy for military households and reduce the
expenditure by the state. In 1217, there were several hundred thousands of soldiers
garrisoned in Henan together with several times of jobless relatives just opened their
month for feeding. He urged for distribute farmlands to military households to
soldiers, and reduce the size of armies. If the state could save one million soldiers,
then it could reduce 3,600,000 million hu of grains annually. 344 In 1221, there were
still around 400,000 populations of elderly and children under military households
living in the Henan and consumed the state 1,400,000 picul grains annually. They did
nothing but just eating up the rent by other commoners.345 This amount of grains
was equivalent to the annual storage by the state at that year, or the annual income of
Jingnanlu (Southern region of Henan). However, the large consumption of grains by
military households still not yet solved. Some soldiers with whole family including
the elderly and teenagers who were originally unemployed joined the armies together.
The reduction of soldiers might risk undermined the fighting will of the team, 346
because some family’s member combating together for the safety of their relatives.347
In addition, some local military officials were highly corrupted and collect extra
amount of subsidizes, wasting the state’s resources.348
Jin had kept large amount of forces for defense, and the expenditure of sustaining
large armies was high, particularly if we compared with Song. For example, in the
last two years of Jin Dynasty, the state still had 200,000 armies around the capital,
distributing to different generals. Also, their monthly salary was 1.5 piculs. 349 The
salary was five times higher than one liter ordinary daily salary of soldiers. We could
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compare the situation with Northern Song. Based on Cheng Minsheng’s research,
Northern Song’s entire number of army from 378,000 to 1,410,000 increased with
time. Kaifeng capital mostly garrisoned 200,000 to 400,000 armies. 350 In 1040,
Shanxi garrisoned 300,000 soldiers which relied on the state to supply grains.
Ouyang Xiu criticized this phenomenon that the national power must be weakened if
there were 400,000 to 500,000 soldiers relied on the state to subsidize the grains.351
After this comparison, Jin Dynasty had more than double, that was more than million
populations of military household population received grains subsidize from the state.
Also there was large amount of soldiers garrisoned around Nanjing, compared with
the Northern Song. Thus it showed the high demands of grains from the huge number
of garrisoned soldiers, together with the fewer resources and available farmlands,
raised serious economic burden to the state.
Officials strongly proposed military farm, however it was not efficient to gain high
yields. We could compare the situation with Northern Song, referring to Zuo
Chaoneng’s study. Northern Song implemented this policy for Hebei soldiers but
they reluctantly cultivate the farms. The average production per person was less than
2 piculs annually, and the average yield per mou was just around 1 picul annually.352
Jin Dynasty forcefully implemented this policy affected the livelihood of tenants as
their farmlands were recalled by the state. Eventually the production of grains in
Henan region reduced and led to increasing number of commoners fled because they
lost their land. Also the state originally collected Niu Tou Tax from military
households, after relocation of capital there was no record on collecting this tax, but
just offering them subsidizes. It showed the state reduced the tax income after
implementing military farm.
Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military Expenditure
There was continuous shortage supply of grains in Henan. Herbert Franke referred to
Jurchen official Hou Zhi’s data to comment Henan’s agricultural production that
“The intensity of agriculture obviously varied from region to region. Honan, in
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particularly the area around Kai-feng, was the definite center of agricultural
production. In 1219, when the territory of Chin had been drastically reduced, Honan
had 1.97 million ch'ing of arable land, of which less than half, only 960,000 ch'ing,
was cultivated…The total grain yield (millet and rice) in the state can be estimated at
about 90 million shih per annum, one-tenth of which went to the government as land
tax…In other words, the average yield from the lands in the whole state could just
feed the population adequately”.353 Cheng Minsheng’s work further elaborated this
point that the farm cultivated in Henan was three times more than the period of
Northern Song. The development surpassed Northern Song.354 Despite the different
perspective of their analysis, they pointed out the production was enough for
expenditure, which I could not agree.
Their dada referred to Jin Shi, recorded that in 1219, Hou Zhi, Minister of Three
Divisions promotion of implementing military farm, and said, “All military and
commoners in Henan had a total 1,970,000 qing of farmlands (197,000,000 mou).
960,000 qing were cultivated. (96,000,000 mou) High quality farm can harvest 1
picul and 2 pecks per mou, middle quality is 1 picul and low quality is 8 pecks.
Government collected 10% tax. Annually the government can gain 9,600,000
piculs.355
Hou Zhi’s argument’s context was to promote military farm. Both Herbert Franke
and Cheng Minsheng ignored that the 9,600,000 piculs tax was just proved ideally
assumed all the farmlands cultivated and had optimum harvest. Furthermore, if the
land turned into military households, the state could not collect tax, thus the state’s
income was not as ideal as Hou Zhi described, and quoted by Franke. It was not
usual to increase of the annual income of the state six times compared with the data
in 1215 that the income of rent only had 1,560,000 picul, mentioned by Gao Ruli.
Here provide a data for the tax collection in 1222. In that year, Jingnanlu (newly set
up circuits in southern part of Henan) had to provide 1,400,000 piculs to the
capital.356 Local officials commented this target was difficult to achieve on time.357
In 1221, Governor Shimo Wolu described originally 398,500 qing farmlands were
cultivated, including 99,000 qing of government owned land in Nanjing Circuit.
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However there were large number of people fled and the situation was similar in
Jingdong, Jingxi and Jingnan Circuit.358 The fled of households already affected the
income seriously. Thus, he suggested distributing the land for military households to
reduce subsidy to them.359
Also, in Henan there was large proportion of newly opened up barren farmlands,
which would lower the yield. Also, in the flooding in 1220, the state could not relieve
the victims. Only half of tax income was from Henan.360 In addition, they ignored the
extra consumption of grains due to the war with neighbouring regions. The lack of
economic foundation forced Xuanzong rejected the Department of State Affairs’s
suggestion to increase military storage in that year. Instead he ordered to reduce the
size of armies because the tax created maximum burden of commoners. 361 The
economic problem was so serious that the state preferred to reduce the burden to
commoners rather than strengthening the military.
We can also compare this source with the reign in Dading (1161-1189). At that
period the state had all the territory including northeast, Shandong, Hebei region, and
collect the same amount of tax compared with the reign of Xuanzong to show the
heavy tax during the reign of Xuanzong. Shizong commented that the annual income
of the state was 9,000,000 piculs. 2,000,000 piculs of the income were reserved for
relief during natural disaster.362 At that time, there were nineteen circuits in the state.
In average, around 470,000 piculs grains collected for each circuit. Circuits in the
Central Plain might collect a higher proportion. After relocation of capital, Jin lost
control to at least eleven circuits, including Hebei, Shandong and Manchuria region
which were the important region of grains production. If Herbert Franke quoted Hou
Zhi’s data was true, then Henan and the western region both responsible for
4,500,000 piculs of tax, which was about ten times increase. Although officials
commented the tax was three times increased after relocation of capital, it might not
reach ten times increase within ten years.
The economy just seemed to be improved in 1223, with 1,800,000 piculs grains
storage, which was three times than previous year, probably with the effective
economic policy. The official commented the storage was sufficient for the state, but
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the heavy levies caused the fled of households.363
Table 2: Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military
Expenditure
Year

Annual

Sources

income
1219

9,600,000

The total amount of farmland in Henan

JS, 47, p.

piculs

was 1,970,000 qing. High quality farm

1055.

could collect 1 picul 2 peck, average
was 1 picul while low quality farmland
was eight pecks. The tax collected one
tenth, annual income was 9,600,000
1161-1189

9,000,000

Annual collection was 9,000,000 piculs JS, 47, p.

(Reign of

piculs

(Whole Nation)歲取九百萬石

1057

1,560,000

240,000 qing of Henan under rent,

JS, 47, p.

piculs

annual income was just 1,560,000 河南 1052

Dading)
1215

租地計二十四萬頃，歲租才一百五
十六萬
1222

1,400,000

Now southern circuit had to transport

JS, 47, p.

piculs

1,400,000 piculs grains to the capital,

1062

(Jingnanlu

and grass 4,500,000 bunches 今南路當

only)

輸秋稅百四十餘萬石，草四百五十
餘萬束

1220

N/A

Now there is flooding in Henan, lots of

JS, 47, p.

people fled, less than 50,000 qing

1055

wheat cultivated, less than half of
ordinary year 今河南罹水災，流亡者
眾，所種麥不及五萬頃，殆減往年

363
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太半

Expenditure on military households after relocation of capital
Year

Amount of
expenditure

1215

3,600,000 piculs

Several million populations of Hebei military

JS, 47,

households relocated to Henan, every people

p. 1052

gain 1 litre, annual expenditure is 3,600,000
piculs. Part of them pay by cash, the state
also had to spend 3,000,000 piculs 河北軍戶
徙居河南者幾百萬口，人日給米一升，歲
費三百六十萬石，半以給直，猶支粟三百
萬石。*
1216

1,635,200 piculs

Now 448,000 population of military

JS, 47,

(Assume every

households should be offered grains 今軍戶

pp.

people receive 1

當給糧者四十四萬八千餘口

1053-

liter grain)
1221

1054.

1,400,000 piculs

For Jingnan, Jingdong and Jingxi three

JS, 47,

(on old and child

circuit, there were 400,000 old and child

p. 1055

military household

military household population, costing

only)

1,400,000 grains expenditure 京南、東、西
三路，屯軍老幼四十萬口，歲費糧百 四十
餘萬石

* Note: There might be incorrect for several million population of military
households to Henan, the number probably be around one million, as described
in the compiler’s notes. (JS, 47, p. 1053)

Section 4 Increased Tax Collection to Cover the Expenditure
Increased Miscellaneous Levies
The worsened economy of the state compelled the court to implement miscellaneous
58

levies. The compilers of Jin Shi commented that late Jin Dynasty suffered the most
serious shortage of economy. Despite Jin aimed at implement policy concerning
commoners, the policy was serious which could not increase the wealth of the state.
The fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the heavy tax implemented, including the
commandeering of grains and obtaining grains from customs, to amass resources
from commoners364 Liu Pujiang had stated that Jin Dynasty had three ordinary tax,
including land tax, properties tax and tax on commodes. The taxes other than the
above three types of tax were miscellaneous levies, usually implemented in specific
regions under special situation, usually in warfare. 365 According to Liu Pujiang’s
research, more than twenty miscellaneous levies imposed to collect money in
different names. 366 He also pointed out Jin Dynasty economic foundation were
destroyed in Hebei, led to the loss of large amount of tax on commodes. The deficits
were compensated by these ten types of miscellaneous.367
The military necessity tax imposed after relocation was one of the heavy taxes to
collect from the military expenditure. Once the storage of the state could not afford
the expenditure on military, then the military necessity tax implemented.368 The tax
on “Horses cultivation” and “military necessity” collected in the reign of Zhenyou
was aimed at collecting silver to balance the value of paper money to enhance its
circulation. 369 It showed the state aimed at collecting the silver from the public
through the implementation of this tax.
Increased Properties Tax
After relocation of capital, the state started to do property survey, commoners hid
their properties and fled to escape tax. Gao Ruli urged the state should not do the
property survey immediately to prevent affecting farmers. 370 Also, heavy tax was
imposed on cattles during 1218. Thus farmers hid their cattles and affected
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agricultural production. Thus there were large piece of barren land in Xincai.371 In
addition, the state further imposed tax on population, properties and ability of
reproduction, to provide the necessity for military usage. Part of commoners fled
because they could not afford the burden. 372 Thus, the state imposed a heavy tax
eventually affected agricultural production and the collection of tax.

Collection of Double Amount of Grain Tax
Apart from collecting miscellaneous levies from commoners to compensate for large
amount of military expenditure, Emperor Aizong also collected double amount of
summer grain tax in 1228, after Mongols attacked Pingyang373 It showed the lack of
storage of the state. Different from previous experience, the collection of extra tax
was in both grain tax and money tax, to obtain the grains from commoners in short
time.
Other Means to Collect Money
Jin Dynasty also confers official title to those who donated the grains. Starting from
1214, the state set up the regulations on donation of grains to obtain confer of official
title. For ordinary people who donated from 150 piculs to 20,000 piculs could receive
different rewards.374 Two years later, the state even allowed middle aged empirical
examination candidates aged 45 or above to donate for graduated title. 375 In addition,
the state also accepted temples and monks and Taoist priest to donate for official
conferred title and religious official position. The amount required was 10 piculs to
70 piculs annually, depended on the classes.376
Proposed to Tax on Cooking Oil Production
To further seizing the resources from commoners to support the expenditures of the
state, some officials even proposed to tax on cooking oil to obtain several hundred
thousand taels of silver, which was nearly equivalent to the amount of tribute paid by
Song. It showed the greed and urgency of the state to obtain money from commoners.
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Wang Sanxi, Tax Minister, proposed the idea and was supported by Shuhu Gaoqi
based on the large expenditure of the state. 377 The purpose was to obtain dozen
thousands taels of silver annually.378
This proposal raised heated debate. Gao Ruli refuted that after started the war with
Mongols, the tax in Henan rose several times, and there was further extra tax on
different items and labour services, all were collected from commoners. In fact,
taxing on oil the state could receive several hundred thousand taels of silver annually,
but the tax came from commoners, it further increased their burden. 379 There were 26
officials who supported Shuhu’s proposal, including household minister, vice
military of labour and Kaifeng governors. On the other hand, several court officials
and Transportation official in Nanjing Province opposed the idea. The opposite
opinion basically argued it was nonsense to prohibit the use of commonly used
commodes, which was never happened in the previous dynasty. 380 Thus the emperor
turned down the proposal.381
Actually, the proposal seems ridiculous, but there were still a number of court
officials supported it. The proposal showed the characteristic of the greedy and
short-sighted policy and the state was seriously lack of resources.
Issuing of Paper Money
Compensate the Military Expenditure
The major reason for Jin to implement paper money was to compensate military
expenditure. Jin Shi recorded that eighty-four carts of goods for military reward were
used in the battle of Huihe 會河之役 against Mongols’ invaders in 1211. The result
was a disaster, but the government did not have intention to solve the economic crisis.
The value of banknotes was so low that it could hardly be used in the market. 382 The
problem was worsened after relocation of capital. Furthermore, there was frequent
warfare. This led further devalue of currency. 383
Rapid Devalue of Paper Money
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The state lost the source of silver after relocation of capital. It had to increase the
intensity to collect money for military expenditures on increasing wars, thus the state
started to issue paper money and banned the usage of coins gradually to increase
collect the wealth from public. Starting from 1215, the paper money gradually
replaced the coins. The usage of coins was fate out to ensure the circulation of paper
money. 384 The banning of using coins aimed at manipulating the value of paper
money with issuing a new one in order to obtain more silver from the public.385The
value of paper money immediately dropped because it could not exchange for coins,
but it affected of business activities and even affected the selling of grains in capital.
Different from Song, Jin implemented paper money without offering interest, but it
collect raw material fee 15 wen per strings.386 There was no expire date on the paper
money, but the state assumed commoners renew it half year. 387 There were nearly ten
types of new paper money issued after relocation of capital. Every paper money had
the similar feature that it had high value at the beginning, but devalued soon. At the
beginning of relocation of capital to Nanjing, a banknote Jiao Chao of ten strings
(10,000 wens) could only exchange for ten wens.Other types of paper money ranged
from 20 strings to 1000 strings. Usually one year after the issue, then the paper
money devalued to worthless.388 Later even it was made by silk called Zhenhuo and
Diyin, but the frequently changing different paper money continued until the fall of
state.389.390
Most of the paper issued in the reign of Xuanzong, showed under his reign the state
increased the intensity to collect from commoners. In 1222, the state issued
Yuanguang Zhenhuo, together with silver as the legal currency. 391 This was an issue
to collect silver from commoners.

Collecting Capitals for Paper Money
To balance the over-issued paper money, the state imposed a tax named as “mulberry
paper money tax”. The state first collected 70,000,000 strings tax from public to
384
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support the annual expenditure. Later the Tongbao turned stagnation of circulation,
double the stated collected double amount.392 All these just happened within the same
year 1217 when the state started war with Song. Commoners did not only suffered
from devalue of paper money, but also had to pay the price of bad economic
management of the state.
Affecting Market Trading
Jurchen strongly prohibited commoners criticizing monetary policy since mid Jin
Dynasty.393 After relocation of capital, although the rapid devalue of paper money,
commoners were forced to use it. 394 To strongly implement paper money, the
government stipulated that one tael of silver could not exceed 300 strings of the
value of Bao Quan. For the goods which the value is lower than three taels could not
use silver. For the goods with higher value, only could be paid by one third value in
silver, others had to pay by paper money. Anyone who ignored the regulation
received punishment. After the order implemented, the market closed and business
activity stopped.395 Also, after relocation of capital and the state used paper money to
replace coins, giant merchants suffered most as they lost most of their properties due
to the change of banknotes system.396 The frequent changing paper money seriously
affected business activities.
Similar to other policies implemented by late Jin, the frequently changing of paper
money and forcefully collecting capitals eventually exceeded of commoners’ effort
and they fled. The paper money also reduced businessman’s capital and hit the
commercial activities. Gao Ruli stated the problems that if the commoners fled, it
would further worsen the military storage and the paper money system. The
consequence was more far-reaching than devaluation of paper money.397 However,
the state continuously manipulating the value of paper money through rapidly issue
new one showed Gao’s opinion was not accepted, and there was fled of households
continued, joined the bandit and became rebellion force. These heavy taxes similar to
killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.
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It could Jin had to wage war with Song just for collecting back the tributes to
solve part of its economic problems.
Section 5: Heavy Tax and Economic Problems Led to Fled
The heavy labor works and tax caused serious financial problems to ordinary people.
In 1215, Censor Tian Jiangxiu 田迥秀 reported to emperor that all the funding of
military and the state was responsible by Henan. Local officials did not concern the
affordability of commoners and tax collected in short period. For those who could
not pay the tax was punished by hitting with sticks. Commoners emptied all their
properties but still insufficient to pay tax. So they fled to other place. They used up
their money. Families were separated and died. Government tried to prohibit it but
cannot stop the problems.398 The hard life of commoners could be seen in the work
collections and writings by contemporary scholars. For example, Zhang Dehui’s
family lost all their properties after the war started in the reign of Zhenyou. 399 In
1217, two third of Henan’s peasants households could not fulfill the amount of tax
payment that year. They had to sell the grains they eat in order to pay enough amount
of tax.400 In 1220, the state had sufficient storage, but the problems of the escaped
households still existed. Also the military tax was too high threatened refugees to
return their hometown and resume their work.401
Eventually, the heavy tax was several times of the past, caused the fled of households.
In Bozhou, there were only one tenth of households existed, while other fled. 402In
Caizhou and Xizhou, 80-90% of households fled. Chenzhou and Yinzhou, 100 li
from the capital only had few amount of households. The agricultural production was
abandoned, but there were rising of bandits. Officials commented the rise of bandits
was due to heavy tax and labour work.403 In addition, the tax originally had to pay by
the fled households turned into existing one.404 Thus there was slippery slope effect
for the population to flee. The significant effect of the fled of households was
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seriously affected supply to armies.405 Furthermore, the heavy tax and the famine in
Suzhou led the fled of households. The consequence was the lack of grains supply in
Guidefu, Pizhou, Suzhou, Xuzhou, Sizhou.406 The lack of grains supply was one of
the cause led to the military failure. Song’s source pointed out part of them fled to
Song to contribute for Song’s military farm and later attacked back.407

State Lack of Relief on Flooding after Relocation of Capital
In addition, through analyzing the state’s relief policy to the serious flooding in
Henan, we could notice the heavy tax of the state, together with the lack of
ability for the state to provide aid.
In Appendices section, we could know that there were two serious floods in 1216 and
1220 after relocation of capital. The flooding in 1216 affected the eastern part of
Henan. The affected region had serious starvation, together with the heavy supply to
Pizhou’s soldiers preparing for southern expedition, led to the fled of households.408
The state only exempted 160,000 piculs tax of escaped households in Zhongjing
(Luoyang), Songzhou and Ruzhou. 409 On the other hand, the flooding in 1220
affected around ten prefectures in Henan and seriously affected agricultural
production. The flooding forced more households in affected region fled. 410 The state
exempted the grains tax, purchase of grains, labor work and mulberry paper money
tax. 411 For example, the state exempted 100,000 piculs grain tax in Bozhou. 412
However, the state could just do these policies to relief the burden of victims.
Different from the flooding occurred in the reign of Dading and Zhangzong, the state
could not offer aid to the affected region. It could only encourage wealthy people to
offer loans to peasants. 413 Only two years later, the heavy tax returned, Jingnanlu
(southern Henan) had to respond for 1,400,000 piculs autumn tax without any
exemption.414 Through the Jurchen court’s respond to natural disaster, it showed the
military expenditure damaged the economy seriously, and could not offer significant
405
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relief to victims as before.
On the other hand, during that period Song provided plenty grains and medicine to
victims of flooding in Shandong and border region.415 Furthermore, Song’s emperor
accepted refugee from Jin, 416 and Meng Zongzheng, Song’s Xiangyang general
recruited dozens thousand immigrants from the Central Plain (Jin), provided them
subsidizes, distributed them farmland and implement military farm. 417 Huai region
and the Central Plain were geographically closed, but there was a great contrast of
commoners’ social welfare between Song and Jin. The increasing number of people
in Jin fled to Southern Song showed the failure of economic policy of Jin, and the
serious consequence Jurchen would face.
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Chapter 3: Southern Expedition (1217-1224) and Relation with Economy
Relocation of capital, the worsened economy and southern expedition is
interrelated. It was raised by Song terminated paying tributes to Jin. It was also
based on limited resources of Jin and increased expenditure after relocation of
capital, including the stipend on military households and the combat between
Mongol and Shandong bandits. Thus, Jin invaded Song during 1217-1224.
Song refused to pay tribute to Jin after Jin relocated the capital, Jin Dynasty started
to discuss on invading Song from 1215. Song’s historians commented Jin invaded
Song was due to the loss of territory.418 Jurchen historians also had similar arguments,
but they further criticized the southern expedition.419 Yuan Haowen criticized that the
military strategy was not workable for ressisting the powerful enemy, but only
suitable for plundering Southern Song through southern expedition. 420 Liu Qi
commented that after moving the capital to the south, it frequently attacked Song.
Because the territory in Henan and Shanxi was small, it planned to capture the land
in Jiangnan. He criticized that Jin could not preserve its property but only could plan
to deprive from others. Furthermore, the war continued for years without any
significant progress.421 Compiler of Treatise of Food and Commodes also lamented,
quoting the Zuo Zhuan that “If there is not enough foundation to collect tax, then the
state had the problems of greed. If the state was based on greed, what the problems
would be like.422 These commentaries could provide an alternative view for us to
consider Jurchen’s pretext for invading Song, which was largely related to relocation
of capital and the economic crisis. Even though Xuanzong later claimed that
invading Song was due to the breaching the settlement of Southern Song and not for
the territory, 423 it was clearly that Jin’s southern expedition planned to regain the
tribute from economic perspective. With the pretext that Song’s bandit, which in fact
was largely rascals and Jurchen’s refugee, and Song’s refusal of paying tribute, 424
Shuhu Gaoqi considered invading Song to compensate the lost in the north.
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Section 1: Southern Song Terminated Paying Tribute to Jin
Briefly Analyzing Jin-Song Relation before 1217 Southern Expedition
After Jin relocated the capital, Song already noticed the problems faced. Song clearly
understood the politics in Jin and also Mongols invaders through the intelligent from
Xi Xia, Shandong and Mongolia. Song court noticed that Jin’s strength was
weakened.425 Starting from 1214, Jin sent envoys to announce the news of relocation
of capital and urged Song to pay back the tribute.426 This issue stimulated discussion
in Song court.
In fact, Song was alert to Jin after its relocation of capital and well prepared for
defence. 427 The Song court asked for proposal to respond to Jin. 428 The public
opinion from Song was almost one sided: to refuse paying tribute. Zhen Dexiu, who
he had been envoy to Jin in 1212, first urged the state to stop paying tribute. At that
time Mongols’ was invading Jin, he witnessed the corruption of Jurchen.429 Zhen and
Lou Yue had similar ideas to terminate tributes and prepared defence in Huai
region.430 Imperial University students even protested for sending envoys to Jin.431
Some were angry that Jurchen polluted Song’s old capital, and it would be shame to
send envoys to there.432 Some looked down upon Jurchen after relocation of capital,
arguing that the Song no longer had obligation to pay the tribute to Bian
(Kaifeng).433Some even noticed Jin already suffered economic problems and noticed
that Jin’s valuable item was stored in Hebei, and predicted Jin was faced with
unfavourable consequence as Henan did not have natural barrier. 434 General Zhao
Fang, Jia She and Chu Yuzhi all predicted Jin would attack Song, as Jin was already
suffered from Mongols’ attack.435 Jia She even pointed out that Jin had used up its
money and grains. He suggested Song not to return tribute to Jin to prevent
strengthening Jin’s power and attack Song again. 436 Shi Miyuan also agreed the
425
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installation of military defense and storage of grains to prepare. 437
Qiao Xingjiang, on the other hand, suggested that “If one of two interdependent
things falls, the other is in danger”. He argued that Mongols was raising, its power
was strong enough to eliminate the Jurchen. The Jurchen, once had been the Song’s
enemy, became the barrier of greater enemy now. Song and Jin shared the common
lots, and should temporary provide Jin tribute to enable Jurchen to resist the Mongols.
Shi Miyuan nearly accepted his long term plan. However, a group of university
students urged the court to prosecute Qiao Xingjian for his suggestion.

438

Contemporary scholars Lu Zhong also strongly criticized Qiao’s suggestion.439
Since the public opinion supported Zhen Dexiu’s suggestions that not to pay tribute
to Jin, Shi Miyuan decided to accept the opinion from majority. In fact, in 1215
Song’s emperor had requested Jin to reduce the amount of tribute, but Xuanzong
rejected the request.440 In 1215, Song rejected Jin’s envoys in Huai Region, thus Jin
prepared to invade Song.441
Evaluation on the Amount of tribute
Because Jurchen used the pretext that Song did not pay the tribute for invading
Song, the following will analyse the evaluated amount of tribute in Jin Dynasty
economy.
Table 3: Evaluation on the Amount of Tribute
Items

Sources

Evaluated
Value

300,000

600,000 strings

taels silver

One tael of silver
equal to 2 strings
遂改鑄銀名「承安
寶貨」，一兩至十兩
分五等，每兩折錢
二貫
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JS, 48, p. 1076.

300,000

750,000 strings

High quality silk was

Lou Yue, Daily Records

bolks of

2 strings 500 wen,

on Traveling to the North

silks

one tael of silk was

樓鑰，《北行日錄》，in

250 wen, in Anyang

Zhao Yongchun edited,

問絹帛價，雲好絹

Records on ambassadors

每疋二貫五百文，

travelling to Liao and Jin,

絲每兩百五十文”

(趙永春編，《奉使遼金
行程錄》) Chang Chun:
Jilin Literature and
History Publisher, 1995. P.
266.

Total

1,350,000
strings

Notes:
1. The silver price is constant, while the price of silk is 1170
2. There might be inflation of silk’s price, particularly after Jin’s lost Hebei,
the major production region of silk

The total amount of tribute that Song paid to Jin was roughly worth 1,350,000 strings.
Since silk was produced mainly in Hebei region,442 the value would be higher due to
lack of resources and loss of production ground in Hebei probably further increased
the value. At that time, the state imposed ban on drinking tea for saving several
hundred thousand taels silver annually. Thus this tribute was an important source of
Jin’s financial income of late Jin. 443 Chan Hok-lam stated that Jin Dynasty used
valuable products like silk and silver, mainly from Song’s tribute, to exchange for tea.
Song’s manipulation on the market and price of tea could get back the lost from the
442
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tribute. However the northern territory lack of resources thus Jin had to rely heavily
on South. 444 Since Song stopped paying tribute to Jin, to prevent the net loss of silver
and silk, Jurchen had to prohibit purchase of tea.445
At the same time, Jurchen lost most of the sources of silver, as Hebei’s silver
mines were lost to Mongols. Therefore, Song’s refusal of paying tribute further
undermined Jin’s economy.
Section 2 Jin’s Decision to Invade Song
The discussion on whether invading Song or not two years after Jurchen
relocated the capital mainly based on economic consideration, while some
arguments was about preserving the dignity of the state. There was a heated
discussion in the court of Jin Dynasty. Lots of censors and some generals who
have good understanding of Song opposed to invade Song; while Prime
Ministers and several generals who had participate the southern invasion during
the reign of Zhangzong supported the invasion. The following will provide an
analysis on this issue to discuss the economic loss of the deterioration of
relation between Song and Jin.
A. Pro-war Opinions
There were several generals and Jurchen officials suggested to start a war with Song.
Shuhu Gaoqi strongly urged the court to invade Song after receiving the suggestion
from Wang Shian to invade Xuyi and Chuzhou, and summoned Song and Red Jacket
Bandit to surrender. Shuhu Gaoqi had participated in invade Song during 1206,
eliminated dozen thousands of Song’s armies and received large amount of military
awards.446 In 1217, Shuhu Gaoqi urged the Jin court to invade Song to increase the
territory of Jin. Xuanzong originally rejected the idea, as he commented that he just
wanted to keep the ancestor’s heritages. 447 Natan Moujia also suggested invading
Song. 448 However, in summer the emperor ordered to attack Song and send the
general Wugulun Qingshou and Wanyan Saibu to prepare invading Song. From that
444
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moment the Song Jin relationship terminated forever.449
B. Anti-War Opinions
The opposite opinion was also based on economic consideration. The court officials
mainly pointed out Jin might not successfully gain from southern expedition.
Furthermore, some even comparing Song’s situation and analysed Jin might face the
loss of war. For example, Prime Minister Li Ge pointed out the state should maintain
peace to enhance the storage. Otherwise, the state could not afford any invasion.450
Some officials commented the weaken Jurchen might not gain victory. Minister Yang
commented that Song had large amount of resources backup in Sichuan and Jiangnan
region. Jin might not win again as the southern expedition in 1206-1207. He warned
that Jin’s southern expedition would invite Mongols’ attack again and Jin might be
facing a two-front war.451 Yang Yungyi was a pro-peace official. Even the state had
relatively better economic and military condition in the reign of Taihe (1201-1208),
he had already suggested the Jin court not to invade Song at that time because it was
difficult to defend the occupied region in Huainan region as Song might block Huai
River, which might block the supply route of Jin.452 Zhangzong partly agreed with
his idea. Thus, after gaining military success Jurchen immediately terminated the war
and renewed the peace settlement in 1207. However, Xuanzong did not accept his
suggestions and continued the wars with Song.
At the outset of the war with Song, Xu Gu already noticed that Song treated Jin
Dynasty as barrier of Mongols invaders. He suggested seizing this opportunity to
maintain peace with Song. He noticed Song did not dare to deeply invade Jin. He
suggested Jin should build rapprochement with Song and attacks Song only if Song
continued its provocation.453 Xu Gu’s argument reflected the contemporary situation
of Song, probably his hometown was in Nanyang closed to Jin-Song border.454 Xu
Gu commented that Jin should seize the opportunity when Mongols invaders took
rest, to keep peace in southern Song, then Jin could enjoy peace soon. He referred to
history that Jin enjoyed more than thirty years peace after Shizong and Zhangzong
449
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signed peace settlement in 1165 and 1208. Jin benefited from the treaties to ensure
the plenitude of the state for more than 30 years. Jurchen actively urged for ceasefire
and gained huge success after peace was reached.455 He also analyzed by weighing
the gain and loss of the state’s economy, and compared the situation with Southern
Song. He said Song’s army stayed in the city, Jin’s army would gain nothing but used
up the grains. Furthermore, Jin only had one province in Henan, and had to obtain
the military funding by forcefully taxing people. He urged the emperor put all forces
to be well prepared for Mongols’ attack, but not making another troubles at the
back.456 Xu Gu clearly pointed the that Jin could not easily get the victory and it
would risk the damage of economy through southern expedition. He also introduced
some suggestions to strengthen the economy. Zhang Xinxin also pointed out the state
should consider its economic situation before southern expedition.457 Although Jin
accepted their suggestions to send envoy to Song to negotiate for peace, Song
returned them in Huai border.458
Some Jin generals also noticed Jin’s economic problem and attempted to maintain a
better relation with Song. On the issue of punishment to Song’s illegal immigration,
General Shujia Tuoluhui relieved their death penalty. He explained that after the state
moved to Henan, the territory was smaller and commoners were poor. Fortunately
the border region was peace, thus people can take a rest. If these bandits were
executed, conflict in the border would be happened.459General Xu Ding also opposed
the southern expedition. When he sent the armies from Qinzhou, Gongzhou and
Fengxiang to attack Song, he still wrote a petition to emperor to oppose the invasion.
He said that it was urgent to point out the interest of Jin Dynasty by not invading the
south. He commented the peace with Song could strengthen the nation. Mongols
invaders eliminated Jurchen’s armies power to one tenth and damaged lots of
weapons. Commoners were exhausted by heavy labour work. Also the frequent
transferring of armies affected Jin but not the enemy. Also, the Mongols might
capture the opportunity to attack Jin. Moreover, he pointed out Song had been well
prepared for military defence after their failure on northern expedition in 1208.
Furthermore, when Jin Dynasty’s capital moved to Bianjing, it was closed to the
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territory of Song. Song had well prepared as they treated it as threat. In addition, Jin
would not gain any resources as Song already relocated the border residents to inland.
460

He also pointed out that the southern expedition might damage of economy and

agricultural production led to crisis. He stated that that Song had long term hatred
against Jin. They still did not forget to recover the old land and revenge for their
shame, but they feared the Jin and failed to estimate Jin’s actual strength, thus they
did not easily start a war with Jin. Even if Jin could win the war, if there were no
storage, still it could not be defence. Fifth, the state might not gain additional grain
through southern expedition because the wars already spent lots of labor forces for
transportation. Also the heavy tax led to the fled of households, and they might turn
into bandits. Sixth, farming activities would be affected. He suggested enhance the
defence and military storage. The state should first self-strengthen and then recover
the lost land, and Song could be conquered later.461 His argument had certain extents
similar to the policy of Song which was focus on defence and strengthened the state
only. Furthermore, Jin’s southern territory had potential to be developed if keeping
peace with Song. In other section, we could see that after the war, Tangzhou and
Dengzhou were destroyed and became lack of grains supply and commoners had to
move to other region for grains, as censors predicted.
C. Decision on Southern Expedition
However, Gao Ruli, the Prime Minister, insisted to invade Song. He criticized Song
was crafty and violated the regulation thus no room to negotiate with Song.
Otherwise Jurchen would be slandered by them.462 Emperor accepted Gao Ruli and
Shuhu Gaoqi’s idea and gave up the chance to negotiate with Song.
Gao Ruli was a Prime Minister who is an expert to economic issues. During the reign
of Zhangzong (1189-1206), he had been censor and transportation minister in Shanxi,
Xijing, Beijing, Hebei and Zhongdu.463 He should have most of his knowledge on the
economic situation in the Central Plain.464 He had been the envoy to Song in 1208.465
He should have certain understanding on Song. However his respond on discussion
460
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of relationship with Song shown that he did not make good use of his knowledge of
economy. He was just based on patriotic sentiment, or obedient to Shuhu Gaoqi, but
neglected the economic and political problems that Jin Dynasty was facing. The
compilers of Jin Shi criticized Gao Ruli although he was an honest and careful
official, he did not oppose the invasion and even banned the negotiation with
Song.466 Gao’s stance on southern expedition was harmful to the state’s fate.
Section 3 Jin Lost Heshuo During Southern Expedition
In summer of 1217, Jin attacked Song because Song had attacked it several times and
refused to pay tribute.467 The southern expedition lasted eight years until Jin sent an
official letter to Song that Jin would not attack the South again in 1224. 468 Although
Jurchen gained some victory at the outset, it could not threaten the Song. Probably
Jin’s armies aimed at plundering rather than attacking military strategic places. On
the other hand, Song accepted Red Jacket Bandits and provisioned them. Thus
Shandong gradually fell to bandits.
Wars for Grains
The economic factors largely explained Jurchen’s invasion against Song. After the
war, Jin Shi stressed on recording the prizes captured through southern expedition.
Just at the beginning of the war, Jurchen attacked Chenzhou (Gansu) and gained
70,000 hu grains and 40,000 strings. 469 Also, they captured Song’s granaries for
9,000 piculs and 300,000 armours. In 1218, the army gained victory in Shouzhou,
gaining 2000 piculs of grains. 470 Shanxi gained greater victory, which captured
90,000 hu grains, thousand millions of coins and large amount of army supplies.471
Despite the military funding were provided by commoners, the spoils were
distributed to soldiers. 472 The state and commoners alike did not gain much. The
small scale victory at the beginning might encourage the state to continue the war.
Song’s official teased Jurchen for the reason that it was similar to a group of angry
466
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bird travelling in forest, and the general leading the starving exiled refugees to
fight.473 The practice by Jurchen’s army showed Jin was seriously lack of grains led
to the expedition.
However, the state did not have sufficient financial support led to military failure.
The invasion spent large amount of money and undermined agricultural production.
The military farm adopted by some generals could not cover up the expenditure. 474 In
1220, Wang Fu garrisoned in Qingzhou defected to Red Jacket Bandits due to the
isolated of the city.475 General of Dongpingfu’s requested to send Henan’s army and
Heshuo’s grains supply to recover Cangzhou, but rejected by the court.476In 1221,
Jin’s army originally could approach Haozhou, but eventually returned due to the
lack of grains.477
Lack of Grains Supports to Warlords Led to Military Failure
The state had long been failure to provide enough subsidizes to loyalists, caused the
military failure. Zhang Kai requested to implement military farming in Hebei when
the armies faced problems of deficient of grains, together requested 300 donkeys, but
the court rejected, until Zhang Kai struggle for several times then received the
permission.478 He requested 20,000 piculs grains from the state, but the state only
supplied 10% to him. He was jealous to another warlord Wu Xian who received more
subsidizes from the court. 479 At the same time, another warlord Guo Minzheng
garrisoned in Northwest border also lack of grains due to the barren of farmland in
garrisoned region. The state ordered Zhang Kai to provide grains subsidise to Guo
but rejected by Zhang. Guo failed and later Zhang also failed due to the isolate of
power.480 The limitation of grains supply from the state led to the warlords failed to
cooperate together to against enemies and eventually failed.
Another warlord who failed due to deficient of grains and defected to Red Jacket
Bandit was Wang Fu, Duke of Canghai. In 1220, Red Jacket Bandits and Song’s joint
armies attacked Heshuo region. After combating a period of time, Wang Fu defected
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due to the isolation of the city.481 After losing Qingzhou, the state refused General of
Dongpingfu’s request to send Henan’s army and Heshuo’s grains supply to assist
recovering Cangzhou,482where it was the important prefecture of Shandong having
salt fields. The state just kept Henan.
Jin Shi compiler commented that Jin had conquered China by military means, but
also lost it in the same means.483 Despite the fact that the warlords were relatively
strong, the lack of grains undermined their defence against Mongols. In addition, the
struggling of the grains among warlords undermined the unity and cooperation of the
loyalists, eventually they were eliminated one by one.
Heshuo Loss after Southern Expedition
Comparing with southern expedition during mid Jin Dynasty, now the Jurchen faced
invasion from several enemies including Xi Xia, Song, Red Jacket Bandits and
Mongols. Shujia Tuoluhui concluded the situation that Shanxi was being attacked by
Mongols after Jin invaded the south, led to the frequent of war, the loss of soldiers,
commoners suffered from intensive labor service. Also, Shouzhou and Sizhou were
connected to the base of Red Jacket Bandit Xuyi and Chuzhou.484 Jin Shi commented
that previously Jin had increased 100 square li of territory daily, but during the reign
of Xuanzong, the state also lost 100 square li of territory daily, and eventually fall. 485
Thus, Jin’s military power was diverged, and the southern expedition was eventually
loss.
Also, one year after Jurchen’s southern expedition, the Mongols invaded Cizhou,
which was 200 kilometers north of Nanjing. 486 Xuanzong was worried. 487 In the
spring of next year, Taiyuan had been lost in 1220. 488 Zhending (Zhengding)’s
General Wu Xian defected to Mongols. 489 Also, Tangzhou and Dengzhou were
destroyed by Song’s army. In addition, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket
Bandits in 1220.
Just after relocation of capital, the increasing tax led to the raise of private security
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groups and rebel the authority. 490 Feng Bi suggested Jurchen should recover
Shandong because there had strong horses and elites. Also there was large amount of
grain production.491 In 1215, Jin’s army eliminated 30,000 armies led by Red Jacket
Bandit’s head Yang An’er492 and killed Liu Erzu and his 10,000 army.493 Besieged by
Jurchen armies, they lacked food supplies, even though they had “mountains of
treasures”.494 In addition, Song, based on the treaty with Jin, rejected these bandits.495
Thus, Red Jacket Bandits were isolated severely undermined.
The situation changed after Jurchen southern expedition. When Jin was preparing to
attack Song, Red Jacket Bandits launched attack on prefectures in Shandong.496 Song
accepted Zhao Fang’s suggestion to attack Jin and accept the bandits. 497 Song also
accepted Jia She’s proposal to provide 10,000-20,000 subsidy quota to bandits. Thus
they could survive and threaten Jin.498 Song also recruited bandits from Huai region.
499

Song was rich in resources, they even increased the subsidy to encourage the

bandits fight against Jurchen.500 Furthermore, these bandits contributed in relieving
Song’s armies from Jurchen’s attack to establish military merit. 501 Li Quan also
turned to Song. 502 Jin’s General Wanyan Eke and Shi Quan invaded Song from
Yinzhou and Shouzhou, originally they occupied several counties and gained some
livestock. Due to the infiltration by Red Jacket Armies, Jin’s armies were totally
defeated by Song. 503 Song frequently rewarded them. 504 Thus, Jurchen could not
capture any cities through southern expedition. Also, Jurchen’s cavalry had
approached Jiangkang. (Nanjing) but Li Quan and Song’s loyalist General Ji Xian
attacked them back. 505 On the other hand, Song captured entire Shandong with 2
metropolitan prefectures, 9 prefectures and 40 counties through the contribution from
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bandits in 1220.506 Thus, Cai Dongzhou’s comment that Jurchen lost Heshuo in 1225
was incorrect.507 Later Wu Xian rebelled Mongol in 1225, but the city was conquered
by Mongols again just after half year. 508 It is clear that even Jin could obtain a
defected metropolitan prefectures, it could not provision it.
Termination of Sea Transportation Connecting Northeast
The unrest in Shandong led to the suspension of sea transportation. Background
chapter had described during mid Jin the state used sea route to transport the grains
from northeast to Shandong and then to the capital. Upraise of Red Jacket Bandits
occupied the sea route. Jin’s general commented that the sea route connecting
northeast must pass through Enzhou and Bozhou. 509 Toyama Gunji suggested that
because Mongols armies occupied Shandong, thus Jin lost the connection to
northeast through the sea route. Jurchen could not retreat to its origin. 510 Herbert
Franke suggested that Jin lost the horses supplies for cavalry forces.511 Jin Dynasty
devoted considerable amount of efforts in recovering the coastal prefectures but
failed.
The problems of transportation also affected Korea paying tribute to Jin together with
market trading. Korean used to have good relationship with Jurchen. 512 In 1219,
Korea planned to submit tribute to the Jin but without success because of the
problem of transportation and the war.513 In 1218, the emperor especially pointed out
the idea planned to reopen market with Korea, and urged the province to manage it
despite the difficulty of the blockage of the route. He hoped to borrow grains and
open the market with Korea, as Korea had long been used to submiting and paying
tribute to the Jin.514 These sources reveal that the route to Northeast was blocked
because of the unrest in the region.Thus there was a lack of connection to the Jin’s
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territory in Manchuria.
Since the Manchuria region was very important, but the loss of Zhongdu terminated
the land route, and it was impossible for the state to recover Zhongdu, the recovery
of sea route was a more possible option. In late 1210s, generals in Shandong
attempted to recover the prefectures in order to connect northeast again. 515 In 1222,
Jurchen’s loyalist armies recovered some prefectures in Shandong, particularly Xinan
which was 200 li away from the pier, the state attempted to use sea route to reconnect
Liaodong, for access to northeast region. 516 However, Jin Shi had no record on
communication between the Central Plain and Manchuria later on, showed the
transportation to northeast terminated.
Section 4 Economic Loss Through Southern Expedition
Through southern expedition, the victory of war could not benefit to the state but the
lost led to serious consequences of the military and financial ability. It led to the loss
of picked troops and created financial problems. Once Mongols armies attack, Jin’s
army could not be defended.517 Officials pointed out the heavy tax and labor work in
Henan after invading Song, and suggested to terminate the war to recover Heshuo,
train the armies and increase the storage.518 Thus, the economic policy described in
previous chapter could not boost up the development in Henan.
Losing Shandong Salt Fields
The loss of Shandong brought significant effect to the state. Jurchen originally had
5,000 loyalist armies garrisoned there.519 In Dongping, there were more than 10,000
soldiers, and used the salt produced in Binzhou to exchange for salt. 520 Shandong
General Hou Zhi used salt to exchange for grains and enhanced business activity,
which could sustain the army without disturbing commoners. 521 It showed the
importance of Shandong’s salt field to support the loyalists.
In the Table “Income of Salt Tax in Different Places” in Appendices, we can see that
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Shandong and Cangzhou salt field yielded 4,334,184 strings and 2,766,636 strings
respectively, which originally contributed to more than two-third of whole state’s salt
tax income during peaceful era. It showed that there was significant income from the
salt to the state. However, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket Bandits during
southern expedition. The salt field also lost to bandits and strengthened their power.
For example, rebelled General Zhang Lin garrisoned in Qingzhou with salt field, he
owned six salt fields for profit. Wang Fu, another rebelled “loyalist” of Jurchen,
rewarded by collect unlimited amount of salt profit.522 When Li Quan’s army passed
through Cangzhou, salt were distributed to them as reward. 523 Zhang Lin even
submitted 200,000 strings to Song.524 It is clearly that the salt was valuable to sustain
the army.
Tangzhou and Dengzhou Destroyed
The southern expedition led to the serious damage to Henan’s border region,
particularly Tangzhou and Dengzhou several times during 1219-1220.525 It was due
to Song’s strategy of relieve of besieged by besieging prefectures of Jurchen adopted
by Zhao Fang. Song’s army did not aimed at deeply penetrating into Jin, but just
seizure of the storage and destroying the defence of these cities. 526 For example,
when Jurchen armies attacking Qizhou and Huangzhou, Song’s General Zhao Fan
besieged Tangzhou and Dengzhou, and pursued Jurchen when they retreated. 527
Meng Zongzheng, Hu Zaixing and Xu Guo also adopted similar strategy. 528 This
strategy weakened the foundation of Jin, and Jurchen did not dare to attack
Xiangyang, Zaoyang and Han. 529 Thus, these regions’ population reduced and
agricultural production affected. Lu Gan pointed out several hundred thousand
soldiers garrisoned in border in the south. Most of residents living near the border
regions in Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shouzhou and Sizhou, as well as certain amount of
soldiers fled, led to the reduction of population.530 Part of these populations fled to
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Song. 531 10 years later, Tangzhou and Dengzhou lost because of the deficient of
grains in these regions.
Trading with Song Terminated
Treaties on Commodes emphasized the importance of the cross-border trading
ground. Goods could be exchanged and the tax collected could be largely benefit for
the state’s income. 532 Shuozhou General Chu Bian pointed out previously he had
proposed rapprochement with Song and established market for trading. Thus there
was plenty supply of food for armies and commoners.533
Since Jin-Song peace settlement signed in 1208, seven markets along border
restored.534 The restoration of Yanzhou market in 1213 gained more than 100,000
strings tax annually. 535 However, these markets were finally closed during Jin’s
invasion since 1217. Song seriously prohibited pirate activities to Jin. Also, they
increase the price of tea and horses to inhibit Jurchen purchase. 536 Lu Gan pointed
out after the expedition, Sizhou’s market’s income lost several thousand bolts of
cloths and several hundred taels of silver.537 The closure of these markets led to the
loss of several hundred thousand strings of tax income. Quan Hansheng suggested
that during Northern Song era grain was transported from the south to the north
through canals. During the Southern Song era, the Song court probibited supplying
the grains to the north. The supplies of grain to Jin reduced.538 The ban of market and
imposed river ban during Jin’s southern expedition affected the exchange of grains in
southern boundary. That reduced the resources supplying to Henan.
Jin Failed to Support Loyalist Army
Song introduced Red Jacket Bandits to defend Jurchen’s attack. Jin also followed
Song’s practice, and kindly treated loyalists with three times salary compared with
ordinary armies. In 1219 when Jurchen was losing Shandong, the state provided
military subsidy to loyalist army originally from Pizhou and Haizhou to organize a
531
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team “victory army”. Every loyalist soldier received 30 mou of land; the strong one
received 50 mou. They received two litre of grains daily subsidy. 539 Originally there
were only 1,000 loyalist soldiers, and the number of loyalist forces rapidly increased
to 7,000 at the end of dynasty.540 The rapid increase of soldiers imposed burden upon
the state, thus later the salary was reduced to the half.541 After the division of Red
Jacket Bandits, despite Xuyi controlled by Red Jacket Bandits defected to Jin, Song
court considered that Jurchen could not sustain the loyalist army.542
During Jurchen’s southern expedition, Xuanzong was confused by Song people’s
unwillingness to surrender to Jin while Jin people easily surrounded to Mongol.543
The lack of resources was perhaps the answer. On the other hand, Song’s royal
family donated 1,500,000 to reward armies. 544 In the falling stage of Jin Dynasty,
Guo Anyong, a defected general of Red Jacket Bandits and Mongols’ general, 545
returned to Song due to the lack of grains. 546 Jin did not gain much achievement
through keeping these loyalist army.
Jurchen further lost its territory after southern expedition and destructed its fragile
economy, but Xuanzong’s court just waiting Song to negotiate for peace, probably
aimed at increasing the bargaining power. They did not know under the pressure of
the public opinion in Song it was impossible to continue paying tribute to Jin again,
particularly Jin no longer could threaten Song after losing entire Heshuo to bandits.
Jin’s general Shujia Tuoluhui pointed out Song was hatred to Jin. It was not their
original wills to be subordinate and respecting to Jin. 547 Until Aizong came to the
throne, it adopted peace policy with Song. Thus there were another ten years of
peaceful period with Song until Mongols invaders arrived Henan and then Song
began to invade again.548 During that period, Red Jacket Bandits were divided, which
consequently diverged Song and bandits’ attention. That allowed the Jurchen to
recover slightly for the following few years. However, the state’s economy was so
539
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fragile that it could not be strengthened to prepare for another military threat.
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Chapter 4: Economic Crisis on the Eve of the Fall of Dynasty

The failure of southern expedition led to the damage of southern part of Henan,
together with the fled of households, seriously affected agricultural production.
In addition, there was excessive soldiers defending Nanjing and relatives of
military households receiving subsidy, led to the capital could not have enough
grains storage. Once the Mongols surrounded the capital, the shortage of grains
supply led to the fall of Nanjing rapidly. Also, the starvation situation led to
Aizong made an unwise decision to flee to weak city Caizhou just because of
grains supply.
The compiler of Jin Shi commented that the fall of Jin dynasty related to economic
problems, and Jin was even the worst compared to all the dynasties since Zhou
Dynasty.549 Aizong, the last emperor of Jin Dynasty also concluded that after the 20
years of relocation of capital, Henan’s people had sold their properties and wife, and
put most of their effort to subsidize the armies.550 Generals and loyalists tried their
efforts to prolong the rule of the state, but the lack of resources of the state eventually
led to failure. Here will introduce the grain supply crisis of Nanjing city led to the
relocate the capital to Caizhou and fall of Jurchen authority.

Section 1 Lack of Grains Storage in the Capital

The state garrisoned too much army led to the shortage of grains supply because
of southern expedition. It could be shown in the policy of grains
commandeering and the sharp rise of grains price. The commandeering of
grains and serious inflation showed the weak foundation of grains supply in
Nanjing. It also showed the state did not have a good management on the
income and storage of surplus for emergency usage after relocation of capital.
The Mongols besieged Nanjing city was an examination to the economy of the
late Jin Dynasty.

Policies On Capturing Grains to Capital and Reduce Grains Expenditure
There was increasing demand on grains in the capital after relocation of capital to
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Nanjing. The commandeering the grains from private’s storage for military use led to
the merchants did not sell the grains there.551 Shi Gaoyi had pointed out the storage
of grains in Nanjing city was not sufficient as counting the storage of the government
and the private, it was less than one percentage compared to the past of Zhongdu.552
The state implemented several measures to invite wealthy people carrying grains to
live Nanjing, at the same time drove away poverty people and reduced the soldiers
garrisoned in capital to reduce the grains burden of the city. The state implemented
the policy to ensure the net income of grains to the capital.
Through migration policy, the state only allowed commoners to bring sufficient
grains to move in Nanjing since 1216. The state assisted the transportation of grains
and storage.553 In 1221, the fled households’ farmland in Henan was confiscated to
provide for military households.554 In 1227, the state encouraged wealthy population
to move into the capital and monitor the collection of autumn tax.555 Two years later,
the state also allowed commoners to farm on the imperial hunting grounds around the
capital which had size of 100 li.556 All the above measures showed the state tried to
capture the grains and increase the production around the capital.

Commandeering Grains in Nanjing
After the Mongols started to besiege the city, the state started to commandeer the
grains and also expelled dozens thousands of population out of the capital.557
In 1232, after Jin failed to sign peace sentiment with Mongol, it recruited commoners
to defend and confiscated the grains in Bianjing. The reason was some officials said
there were 970,000 piculs storage of grains in the capital. 558 Some suggested to
commandeering the grains to obtain million piculs of grains. 559 Wanyan Zhushe
warned citizens that if there was lack of grains supply, then the family members
would be executed and eaten up by military. One widow who had a son with a
husband died, stored just three liters excessive amount of beans, was beaten to death
and all the grains were confiscated. Other people discarded their grains to toilet after
551
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knowing the news. Eventually less than 30,000 hu (or 15,000 piculs) grains were
obtained.560 Both wealthy and poor people were all starved to death. Liu Qi stayed in
Nanjing and witnessed the the siege of the city. Nanjing’s granaries were emptied
and citizens were anxiety on the rumors. Every people were only allowed to store
three pecks grains. The searching team was led by censor and General brought
weapons to search everywhere in the house, including the ground. Royal family
including emperor’s brother and imperial concubine did not have exception. There
was no legitimacy of the state. Some of the rascals became spy for enemies. It was
the sign of the fall of dynasty.561 The amount of grains commandeered was hundred
times less than expected. The price was all residents and officials lived in the capital
was suffered from starvation.
Here will provide the amount of monthly consumption of the grains by every people.
During the reign of Zhangzong, people consumed around 5 pecks of grains per
month.562 These eight pecks grains could only provide commoners to withstand for
just more than one or two months. It did not have enough support on the long term
defense. People in the capital started to eat human being, and the state then allowed
soldiers and commoners to move out the city for food. 563 Also, the state ordered
commoners to sell their grains to pay the military necessity tax of next year in
advanced. Grain tax of upper households could replace for cash tax.564 In 1232, the
state even reduced the amount of imperial armies. Hungry soldiers killed the gateman
and fled out the city.565 Originally, lots of people brought the grains to the capital and
the poor were driven out the city. However the high grains consumption in the capital
seems used up the grains shortly. After long term war with Mongols, there were still
1.47 million populations in the city, including refugees.566 Just before the fall of the
city, Nanjing had outbreak a large scale of plague, led to more than one million
people died.567 It showed that during the fall of Nanjing, it had more than 2.5 million
people including refugees stayed there. Assume that every people had eight pecks in
their home. The 15,000 piculs grains commandeered showed every person only
560
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responded 6 litre of grains to the state during the grains commandeering policy. After
the plague, the state even doubled the tax from doctors, monks and coffin makers
who gained profit through the plague.568 All the excessive resources were captured
by the state.

Serious Inflation
The price of grains also reflected the shortage of grains supply. Liu Qi recorded
the terrible situation of citizens suffered from starvation.

Commoners consumed up all their grains. The price of grains rose sharply to
two taels of silver. Poverty people had to eat dead body and they ate all the flesh
part within one night, while officials used carts to transfer the grains out of city
daily. Gentlemen and ladies had to beg on the street, some even ate their child.
Valuable items like high silk clothes and classical tools could not even exchange
several litres of rice. People worried they would be killed by hungry people thus
they did not come back home late. Old friends and relative gathered together
just for one meal. Furthermore, people killed their horses and cows, and even
cooked the cages, saddles which made by leather to eat the skin. Everything
which could eat was cooked. The woods in wealthy family and restaurants were
all demolished for sell. The city turned into ruins, and the past flourish no longer
existed. Officials fled to the north with their family, shown the state soon would
be fallen soon.569
During 1232 when the grains’ price rose to two taels of silver, people did not care the
value of gold and silver to exchange for food. They sold their pearls and jades,
dedicated decorations and clothes in Tianjin Bridge Market, just wanted to buy litre
of rice or beans for emergency use. Liu Qi remembered his family used a very nice
silk suit to exchange for 8 pecks rice. He also used a gold hairpin to exchange a
568
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shoulder size of beef. He lamented the grains were more valuable than treasures and
experienced old people idiom that firewood is Chinese cinnamon while rice is
pearl.570
We could compare the problem of inflation of the falling Northern Song’s capital
faced the surrounding by Jin’s army 100 years ago. Wang Zengyu quoted the
northern Song’s San Chao Bei Meng Hui Bian and suggests that at the early stage
when Dongjing (Kaifeng) was surrounded by Jin invaders, every peck of rice worth
1,200 wen, wheat was 1,000. After half a year surrounded by Jin, the price of rice
rose to 2,000 wen, while wheat increased to 2,400 per hu (5 pecks) . 571 Referring to
Gui Qian Zhi, the price was two taels, which was equivalent to four strings. The
inflation was double than northern Song facing the same situation.

Table 4: Serious Inflation of Grains in Nanjing in the Falling Jin Dynasty
Year

Price

1232

2 taels per peck,

Rice sharply increased to 2 taels

Gui Qian Zhi,

or 4000 wen

silver 米升直銀二兩

p. 127

10 teals platinum

10 teals platinum per peck 斗米白

Runan Yi Shi,

per peck

金十兩

p. 35

corns with hard

The price of flour is 210 wens per

Bei Xing Ri

surface: 120 per

catty, grain with hard surface was

Lu， P. 266.

pecks

120 per peck, corn’s price was

Rice: 240 wen

double, and wheat was 60.面每斤

per pecks

二百一十，粟穀每斗百二十，粟

1233

1170

Sources

米倍之，陌以六十
1183

134 wen per

Annual tax was 64,000 strings,

JS, 47, p.

peck (National

equivalent to 86,000 piculs 有司上 1058.

price)

其數，歲約給六萬四千餘貫，
計折粟八萬六千餘石。

1127

Rice: 1200 per

Rice 1200 per peck, wheat 1000
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(Northern

peck,

per peck, donkey meat 1500 per

Meng Hui

Song,

Wheat: 1000 per

catty, goat meat 4000 per catty,

Bian, 76.

when

peck

pork: 3000 per catty 雪雨不止，

Bianjing

物價日翔：米斗一千二百、麥斗

was

一千、驢肉. 一斤一千五百、羊

besieged)

肉一斤四千、豬肉一斤三千，今
不復有也。

1127

Rice: 2000 per

Rice 2000 per peck, wheat 2400

San Chao Bei

(Northern

peck,

per hu (5 peck), goat meat 7000

Meng Hui

Song,

Wheat: 480 per

per catty, pork 4000 per catty,

Bian, 87.

after

peck

donkey meat and fish 2500 per

Bianjing

catty

was

城被圍半年，至是斗米二千，斛

besieged

麥二千四百，羊肉一斤七千，豬

for half

肉一斤四千，驢肉一斤二千五

year)

百，魚亦如之。

Through Liu Qi’s record of food supply in Nanjing after the city was surrounded by
Mongols, it showed that there was a large number of people and insufficient food
supplies. The situation was even more serious, compared with the Zhongdu. We can
refer to Yuan Yi Tong Zhi to analyse the food produce and supply from neighbouring
region. As previous chapter described, Dadu (Zhongdu) had large amount of grains
production, also Baodi supplied poultry and seafood, the region around Kaifeng,
which only produced pear. 572 Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi quoted Song Shi Bi Duan Lun
Bianjing Nan Shou that Bianjing was not a suitable place to be foundation of state,
because it did not extraordinary in production. 573 Although the grains production
increased after the implementation of wet paddy field, the fall of southern Henan
showed the deficient of grains. Therefore, despite residents in Nanjing was relatively
wealthy with storage of lots of treasure, everyone still suffered from starvation, due
to the lack of food supply.
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Section 2 Jin Failed to Rapprochement and Song’s Counterattack

The eight-year war with Song worsened the relationship with Song seriously. The
ceasefire agreement with Song was reached in 1224,574 but it did not mean a full
rapprochement with Song. Jin and Song did not send envoys to each other anymore.
Jin’s envoy or representatives were returned by Song’s border generals. In addition,
Song even did not trust Jin’s ceasefire agreement at the beginning, until Jin’s court
continuously sent edict to the border region not to invade the south for ten years, then
Song started to accept and prepare for rapprochement.575Jin’s generals had attempted
to show their goodwill to Song to attack the rebelled Red Jacket Bandits together and
not to accept the surrendered bandits,576 but Song rejected the request.
After Jin Dynasty southern expedition ended, when Jin’s generals faced deficient of
grains, they requested Song’s generals garrisoned along Xiangyang and Huai border
to borrow grains, but all the Jin’s representatives was rejected by bordering generals.
In 1231, when Jin noticed that the Mongols had bypassed Hebei and attacked from
the west, the Jin originally invited Southern Song to jointly attack Mongol, and
aimed at requesting grains subsidize. The communication problem worsened the
build-up relationship with Song.577 Eventually, the cooperation with Song failed. In
addition, after Aizong fled to Caizhou, Jin’s warlord Wu Xian moved to Dengzhou
for grains. When there was a shortage of grains in Dengzhou’s granaries, Wu Xian
sent representatives to borrow grains from Song’s general Shi Songzhi. The poor
communication of both sides not only led to the failure of grain procurement, but
also undermined the relationship between Southern Song and Jin.578
In 1233, Aizong was worried as he knew that Mongols’ envoy had visited Song.579
Naizu Ahudai suggested the state should prevent Song and Mongols join together to
attack Jin. Jin should make use of the opportunity to enhance the relationship with
Song after the state fled to Caizhou, to request for military assistant, or borrow the
grains, or at least not to assist Mongol to prevent being attacked in both sides.
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Emperor Aizong sent him to Song, with message pointed out Song and Jin shared a
common lot. Song subsidizing Jin was similar to protecting Song itself. Aizong’s
argument was similar to Song’s official Qiao Xingjian stated in the court in 1214 and
Hu Qu’s suggestion around twenty years ago. Jin suggested that Song should lend
them one million piculs of grains.580 Song rejected the proposal, and soon started to
respond Mongols’ request by attacking Tangzhou and later Caizhou. Tangzhou was
fallen because of insufficient food shortage. 581 Dengzhou also surrendered to
Song.582 Actually if Song fulfilled Jin’s request, it could help Jin a lot. In Xiangyang,
Song rejected Jin’s request but they provided ten thousand soldiers led by Meng
Gong and Jiang Hai with three hundred thousand piculs of grains to assist its enemy
Mongols.583 It strengthened the force to eliminate Jin.
The joint attack from Song and Mongols attack to Nanjing and Caizhou was the
worst situation to Jin. The reason was Song had advantage of war during spring and
summer while Mongols had advantage during autumn and winter. Both of armies
could take turns to take rest. Furthermore, Song provided grains support to Mongols
helped Mongolian invaders had a long term surrounding the Jin Dynasty capital. As
warned by officials before, Jin moved to Henan would increase the chance of conflict
with Song, and there were no more way to retreat.

Section 3 Relocating Caizhou For Grains and The Fall of Dynasty
The lack of grains in Henan and the weak defence of the city also affected generals’
decision to save the capital. The agricultural activity in Henan was suspended, and
there was no hope for reinforcement. 584 Wu Xian originally was the strongest
warlords at the beginning of conferring the nine Dukes. 585 After Wu Xian returned
back to Jin, he was still one of the strongest existing warlords in the late Jin. After Jin
failed in the battle of Sanfengshan, the situation of Nanjing worsened. Despite Jin
sent 15,000 soldiers to assist Wu Xian,586 Wu Xian refused to assist Jin to defend the
capital as he was the most-wanted man of Mongols. He worried that during the
580
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emergency of the state, he would be captured to send to Mongols. 587 During the
falling state in Caizhou, the state ordered warlord Wu Xian to defend the capital, but
Wu Xian continued to reject due to the lack of grains and limited route there.588 It
showed the lack of grains around the capital also affected loyalist armies to save the
capital. Wu Xian’s worry was true because both Caizhou and Nanjing could not
provide enough grains for the armies. Other generals either refused to assist or being
defeated. Thus there was no more reinforcement went to Nanjing.589
Aizong was frustrated that there were increasing enemies but the grains running
out.590 He also disappointed that warlords did not assist the capital. In 1232, Aizong
decided to flee to the regions having enough grains supply, without serious
considering the long termed defensive ability. His bodyguards and the officials
already suffered from long term starvation. 591 The starving emperor, officials and
soldiers decided to leave Kaifeng and fled to Caizhou for grains, despite there were
lots of disadvantages to garrison at there. Caizhou’s general Wugulun Hao sent 400
hu grains to Guidefu to invite the emperor to there, and the emperor accepted.592 400
hu grains was just a insignificant number, compared with Song’s supply of million
piculs of grains to Xiangyang when it was being besieged by Mongols dozen years
later.593 Aizong’s decision to relocate to Caizhou reflected the serious shortage of
grains in Henan. Jin attempted to recover two cities in Hebei due to the deficient of
grains in Nanjing. However, the 60,000 armies were defeated by Mongols.594
Caizhou was not a place excellent for military defend, as Guo Anyong, defected Red
Jacket Bandit general immediately pointed out, together with the arguments that the
difficult of grains supply if the city was surrounded by armies, and the close distance
to Song would risk the loss of grains to enemy. Court officials rejected his opinion to
relocate to Shandong. 595 Guo also suggested the second choice for emperor to
relocate to Guidefu. He pointed out Caizhou at that time had more food storage than
Guidefu, but in long term Guidefu had substantial supply of fish and vegetable.596
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However, Bai Hua commented the problems that grains would be consumed up in
Guidefu597 In addition, General Wanyan Zhongde had suggested relocate to Qin and
Gong region, as there were plenty of grains. Also, it could prepare for conquered
Sichuan and Xingyuan. He had been prepared armies and cavalries for western
expedition.598 However, Aizong and his bodyguards refused to move in order not to
affect their family and business.599 Later, Song’s General Meng Gong blocked the
road to Sichuan,600 the chance to fled to the west lost.
Although Caizhou originally had more grains supply, soon Caizhou also faced food
shortage problems after the city was surrounded by joint armies of Song and Mongol.
Jin needed to reduce the excessive amount of officials and soldiers and the salary
paid for them. 601 All the officials under court officials, their monthly salary were
reduced to only less than six pecks of grains. At the same time, the state confiscated
city residents’ grains.602 The salary was merely enough for monthly consumption for
one person, which was slightly lower than the maximum amount of allowed storage
per person. The state issued new type of paper money, but eventually the state issued
too much amount paper money devalued the currency after it was implemented for
just more than one month.603 In 1233, Jurchen drove away the old and young citizens
out the city. 604 Also, the state implemented the Grains Commandeering Measures,
that every adult could only store eight peck of grains while children aged ten allowed
storing maximum of five peck. Death penalty implemented for illegal storage of
excessive one litre grains. These officials dig the ground and removed the wall to
search. There was huge amount of people who ignored the regulation and received
penalty, and 25,000 piculs of grains was confiscated. 605 It was just a repeat with
previous practice in Zhongdu and Nanjing. Later, the shortage of grains was even
more serious than Nanjing, with one peck of rice valued 10 taels of platinum. Hungry
people resorted to cannibalism. 606 It was a great contrast to Mongols’ invaders
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having party to celebrate Chinese New Year outside Caizhou.607 On the eve of the
fall of Jin, as revealed by Song Shi, Caizhou was lack of grains. Old and child were
being eaten. Armies ate bones and grasses with muds. They were even extracted as
“Human fueled Canons” for defense.608 Whole lost troops were executed due to the
lack of grains, thus most of soldiers wanted to surrender.609 Eventually, under the
strong attack from Song and Mongols’ joint army, Caizhou was fallen, and Jurchen
was eliminated.
Referring to the fall of dynasty, Yuan historian Yao Sui argued that the state
confiscated grains to support the army to prolong its falling fate, to defend a growing
power, created serious burden for people. 610 It described the heavy tax and labor
work, together with commandeering of grains reduced people’s willing to defend.
They even preferred the Mongols to conquer the place as soon as possible in order to
solve the grain crisis. It revealed that the worsening economy speeded up the
collapse of the state.
Caizhou was not a good defensive city, thus it was fallen under the strong attack by
the joint armies from Song and Mongol. It was not a wise decision for Aizong to flee
from Nanjing to Caizhou, however there was no alternative choices due to the lack of
grains in Nanjing. As the fall of Jin Dynasty, the millions of starving soldiers and
commoners relieved as they were pardoned by Mongols’ General Ashu and were
allowed to migrate to cross the Yellow River to farm at the “paradise” for food.611
The serious grain crisis could be shown in Song providing one million grains to
Henan after they conquered the region. In the region, agricultural production “was
abandoned” and people suffered from starvation.612
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Conclusion
As described by officials, the relocation of capital to Nanjing raised lots of
problems. The mistakes in policy-making further significantly undermined the
economy, shaken the foundation of the state. That largely explained the fall of
Jin Dynasty.
Mistake on Relocate the Capital to Henan
Nanjing was convenient for transportation if the state was united between North and
South. In terms of water transportation, Nanjing located the junction region. During
the reign of Mingzong of Later Tang, General Shi Jintang had commented that
Yimen (Kaifeng) was the important military strategic place. 613 The geographical
advantage of Bianliang also attracted Hailingwang to move the capital there.
Hailingwang planned to construct and relocated to Bianjing, as a base to invade
Southern Song to unify China. 614 However, it was not a suitable place to defend
invader’s attack. Prime Minister Zhang Xinxin pointed out that since five dynasties
the dynasties setting the capital in Kaifeng just made use of Yellow River as natural
barrier, but not for the purpose of military expedition. Northern Song had most of the
Central Plains together with the whole regions of the southern part of rivers.
However, Jin did not conquer the south, thus most of the canals travelling in north
and south direction were useless. Thus the advantage of Kaifeng capital could not be
well used.
Also, the cost on keeping large amount of soldiers to defend the capital was
excessively high. Although it had a constructed palace, the price was that the
natural barrier was not as obvious as in Hezhong region. Thus the state had to
garrison around several hundred thousand soldiers there. Eventually, the long
term expenditure far outweighed the cost of constructing a palace.
Western Region Offered Backup to Henan
During the debate of relocation of capital, the emperor rejected relocating the
capital to Hezhong. In fact, Hezhong closed to mountainous western region, the
natural barrier was more useful. It could reduce the expenditure for keeping
613
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large amount of soldiers.
Shanxi was rich in grains production. It had exported large amount of grains to Song
previously. Quan Hansheng referred to Song’s documents and described that Jin had
exported the grains from Shanxi region to Song to exchange for 200,000 strings of
coins in early Jin.615 It showed the sustainable grain supply in that region. In addition,
after losing Heshuo region, Xiezhou salt field in Hezhong became the only existed
salt field of the state until the end of Dynasty. Jin seriously protect this salt field,616to
capture the income. Also, it would be an advantage for Jurchen armies to defend if
any invaders attacked from downstream, that is in eastern side, as it had the
advantages of look down from a height. Jin gained series of victory in its southern
expedition in the western front during Taihe expedition (1207) to the southern
expedition during Xuanzong.
Weak Defence in Hezhong and the Loss of the Region
Despite Hezhong was a military strategy region, the court ignored the defence
there. Thus it was destroyed by Mongols’ invaders and the economy was hard to
recover.
In the winter of 1216, the Mongols occupied Tongguan, and later it captured
Songzhou and Rujian. Censor Shi Gaoyi warned that the failure of wars along Yellow
River was mainly the result of the state inactive response to Mongolian’s attack.
Thus the enemy deeply penetrated into Jin’s territory. He pointed out that Jin had
several hundred thousands of well-trained soldiers in the capital but none was
deployed to defending the Mongols. 617 Zhang Xingxin suggested the state should
well manage Guanzhong (Shanxi) and Heshuo for future recover the lost territory
and for self-strengthening. Otherwise, it would be difficult to defend Kaifeng. 618
Feng Bi also pointed out if Hezhong lost, then Henan and Shanxi would be in
dangerous situation.619 However, Xuanzong sent a wicked general Wanyan Aludai to
garrison in Hezhong region worsened the situation. Around 1216-1217, Aludai
worried the attack from Mongolian invaders, he spent large amount of labour forces

615

Quan Hansheng, Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin, Proceedings of Song, Khitan and
Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973. Pp. 239-240.
616
JS, 16, p. 366.
617 617
JS, 106, p. 2343.
618
Yuan Haowen Quan Ji, 20, P. 431
619
Yuan Haowen Quan Ji, 19, p. 521.

97

to construct the wall but gave up the defence on Hezhong soon after Jiangzhou was
fallen. Thus, Hezhong region was destroyed by Mongols’ attack. After Aizong
succeeded the throne, there was a discussion on whether repair Hezhongfu. Some
censors opposed because it was destroyed, and insufficient to defend it. 620 The state
accepted these scholars’. Furthermore, Aizong also passively defended Hezhong and
Shanxi region, which refused to fight with Mongols.621 Thus after Mongol attacked
from the west, Jurchen army was besieged in Henan.
Confrontation with Xi Xia
Furthermore, Xuanzong did not intend to terminate the war with Xi Xia, thus the
armies could not focus on defending Mongols and eliminating bandits. The war
started since 1213 until 1224,622 terminated eighty years peace between two states,
led to the loss of packed troops of both states.623 During the war, Xi Xia had captured
Huizhou.624 Up to several hundred thousands of soldiers were involved in the war.625
Song joined Xi Xia’s army since 1219 after Jin’s southern expedition worsened the
situation.626 Both side neither gain nor loss, but it created economic burden to the
state. For example, the recovery plan of Huizhou required 30,000 piculs of rice and
9000 weighing unit of grass monthly, and not less than 100,000 labors to transport
the materials. The amount would be further increased if the army could not conquer
the city within the time. Also, Lintao circuit was emptied by bandits, affected
agricultural production.627 Also, the termination of trading with Xi Xia affected the
supply of horses.
The Loss of Hezhong and Critical Condition of Henan
In 1231, Mongol’s strong force with advanced war-ship equipped with canons,
Hezhongfu eventually lost despite Jin’s general Wanyan Eke put most of the effort to
defended for three months. 628As Hezhongfu lost, the Mongols immediately crossed
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Yellow River through Heqing County.629 Jurchen lost its natural barrier which they
relied on. Jin had mobilized large amount of soldiers to defend Mongols in the battle
of Sanfengshan to resist Mongols’ attack but failed in result. 630 Two months later
Mongols’ reached Nanjing and started to besiege the city. 631 Hezhong originally
provided grains and protection to Nanjing. Once Hezhongfu loss, Nanjing became
isolated and there was a shortage of grain within the city.
On the other hand, parts of the garrison armies of Jin Dynasty strongly resisted
Mongols armies, particularly in the western region. Sources recorded that after the
fall of Jin Dynasty, the Mongols attacked the remaining prefectures, but twenty
prefectures in Qinzhou and Gongzhou still could be defended. 632 It showed that
Shanxi still had enough resources to resist the enemies, while Nanjing lacked the
necessary resources to defend. During the last year of Jin Dynasty, Aizong lost the
opportunity to move to western region, thus the Jin court lost the chance to revive the
state.
Jin’s scholar Liu Qi commented that it was a mistake to move the capital to Kaifeng.
If the Jin court had defended Guanzhong, it might extend the reign for several
generations. Also the state did not prepare for revival, but survive just for the sake of
several years after moved to Nanjing. 633 The loss of Hezhong and Nanjing after
sieges, thus, was directly the wrong choice of capital location and military strategy.
Short Sighted Strategy of Southern Expedition
After the relocation of capital, Jin-Song relationship deteriorated, and southern
expedition was followed. Some historians suggests that it was related to the
confrontation between Jurchen and Han ethnics. In fact, Jurchen’s southern
expedition probably related to Shuhu Gaoqi’s acceptance of greedy civil
servants’ opinion, while Song’s attitude was due to their long term hatred to
Jurchen.
Promotion of Wicked Civil Servants
Jurchen’s decision on southern expedition was independent from ethnic problem. In
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Jurchen court, Han and Jurchen’s status was similar, which was different from Qing
Dynasty. (1636-1911) It was common that Han and Jurchen nominate each other
without ethnic boundary.634 Also, it was not related to military and Confucianism. As
analyzed before, there were some Han economic officials suggested to attack Song,
while there were also some Jurchen generals against it. It showed in Jin Dynasty, the
southern expedition was based on economic consideration.
The southern expedition was directed by Shuhu Gaoqi. His policy to foreign state
was highly related to his experience. He had successfully defeated Song in the 1207.
On the other hand, he lost in the war with the Mongols in 1213, and almost faced
death penalty. His policy mainly gave up Heshuo region to prevent direct conflict
with Mongols. At the same time, he thought that the state could defeat Song as
previous, but did not know that Jin had used whole nation’s effort to attack Song
during 1206-1207,635 while Jin’s army was distracted by Mongols, Xi Xia and Red
Jacket Bandits.
The policies also related to Shuhu Gaoqi preferred to promote civil servants instead
of scholars. Lin Huangda analyzed the difference between scholars and civil servants
in traditional China and pointed out civil servants were greedier and proposed shortsighted plan. 636 The southern expedition together with other economic policies
showed these characteristics, aimed at gaining financial incomes in short time but
ignored the long termed consequences, like the fled of households.

However,

Xuanzong acceptance of the suggestions caused inevitable consequences. Compiler
of Biographies of Jin Shi also commented that after relocation of capital, it was just a
weak state. Shuhu Gaoqi preferred civil servants but hate scholars; he likes wars but
not peace. The state was rapidly heading to fall.637 Shuhu Gaoqi was responsible for
military issue, while Gao Ruli was for economy and promotion of officials. Both of
them were corrupted and expelled the opposites. Furthermore, Shuhu Gaoqi’s pursuit
of military power led to southern expedition. They did not planned to recover Hebei,
but putting strong armies in Henan. 638 Thus, it could explain Jin insisted to
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implement southern expedition because of the selfish Prime Ministers.
Zhao Yongcun commented that Jin should adopt a friendly policy to Song, including
leaving the tributes temporary and even return some of the territory to Song in order
to capture the support from Song.639 His suggestion was somehow idealistic. Song
terminated the tributes already hurt the weakened economy of Jin. Also the limited
territory of Jin after relocation of capital make the option “return some territory to
Song” impossible.
The possible option for Jin Dynasty was following Xu Ding and Xu Gu’s
suggestion by keeping peace with Song to rapidly develop the prefectures
closed to southern boundary to fight against Mongols. If Jin devoted more effort
to developing these regions, it might provide plenty capitals and manpower for
defending Mongols. Also Jin could benefit from the trading with Song to obtain
more resources to fiancéthe war and the state’s economy.
Furthermore, the heavy taxation severely affected production. It was a dilemma
for Jurchen commandeering farmlands from talents renting state owned land to
distribute for military households or increase tax collected from talents to
support for military households. Jurchen government chose to implement
military farm, it affected large amount of peasants’ livelihood, large amount of
commoners fled to Song or turned into bandits.
We can compare the achievement of military farm in Song’s Xiangyang implemented
in similar period. Shi Songzhi and Meng Zongzheng implemented military farm in
Xiangyang and later Zaoyang since 1228. Meng accepted 10,000 refugees, providing
them subsidy and farmland.640 Later he further recruited 20,000 Henan’s refugees.641
His son Meng Gong’s military farm could yield 150,000 piculs annually. 642 Under
the policy, the accumulated grain production in these regions was 680,000 piculs.643
Furthermore, Jurchen recruited Jin’s refugees as soldiers and implemented military
farm to enhance military storage.644 Thus, when Xiangyang fell to Mongols, it still
had 300,000 cash and grains.645After comparison, we can notice the low efficiency of
implementation of military farm in Jurchen. It might be due to the loss of manpower
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or the frequent of war with Song. Jurchen did not accept several censors’ opinion,
and lost the chance to implement military farm in southern region of Henan. Thus,
Jurchen lost due to the deficient of grains supply. It suggested that the Jin’s economic
means and performance was far from satisfaction, particularly when comparing with
its neighbouring nation, the Southern Song.
Song’s Careful Foreign Policy by Prime Minister Shi Miyuan
The court in Southern Song was dominated by conservative Shi Miyuan. Song was
very alert to the political situation and changes of Jin Dynasty, because of the
reference of political consequences after the failure of northern expedition in 1207.
Song rejected envoys representing Genghis Khan’s invitation about jointly attack Jin
in 1214646 and executed He Jiuling who attacked Jin arbitrarily. His body was ranged
on the boundary in high tone. 647 After Jin’s invasion, Shi Miyuan subsidized the
bandits only in low profile.648 Li Tianming pointed out that Shi Miyuan refused to
recruit loyalist army in high profile because he worried the failure would bear
political responsibility. Song just used the loyalist army as barrier and wanted to keep
a distance to them. 649 Thus, Song witnessed the weakening Jurchen and without
concrete plan to eliminate it. In 1228, Song noticed the strong Mongol attacked Jin,
but it only strengthened the defense in the border region. 650 At the very end which Jin
was nearly eliminated in 1234, the court in Southern Song still did not have intention
to eliminate Jin, probably due to the strong enemy Mongol was behind Jin.
In the dominant opinion in Song’s court, after Hu Qu proposed to negotiate with Jin
rejected, there were no more suggestions on supporting Jin.651 In addition, most of
Song’s generals were against negotiation with Jin. Song’s General Meng Gong, who
had contributed a lot on eliminating Jin in 1230s. In fact, his father had been captured
by Jurchen during Jin’s southern expedition in late 1210s.652 It may lead to his hatred
to Jurchen. Actually, in 1232, just before the fall of Jin, Song was shocked by

646

Xu Bian Liao Chao Gang Mu Bei Yao, 14. P. 255.; Jiangyan Yi Lai Chao Ye Zha Ji, 19. P. 848.;
Meng Da Bei Lu, Wang Guo Wei Quan Ji, Vol. 11. P. 356.
647
SS, 39, p. 760.
648
SS, 475, p. 13819.
649
Li Tianming, Song Yuan Zhan Shi, pp. 16; 195-200.
650
Song Ji San Chao Zheng Yao Jian Zheng, 2010. Pp. 35-36.
651
Construction Minister Hu Qu suggested to negotiate with Jin, and was accused by bachelor
students. (Song Shi Quan Wen, 2005. P. 2114.)
652
SS, 412, p. 12369.

102

Mongol’s invasion to Sichuan region. 653 Just after Shi Miyuan died, Lizong
immediately held discussion on the important political issue with Zhao Fan and Zhao
Kui, particularly on the border issue. They urged the state to remember the history of
signing settlement with Jurchen in 1120. 654 Through their conversation, they still
remember the fall of Northern Song after uniting Jurchen to eliminate Khitan. Lizong
accepted Zhao’s suggestion to strengthen the force first and later revenge the Shame
of Jinkang. 655 Although Zhao’s family strongly against negotiation with Jurchen
before, their attitude changed. It was probably due to their notice on stronger
Mongols through elimination of Red Jacket Bandits. Zhao previously had accepted
Jurchen’s negotiation after the failure of rebellion of Red Jacket Bandits.656 Richard
Davis explained in his book Court and Family in Sung China 960-1279, “his (Shi
Mi-yuan) insistence that the south not intervene in the expanding Mongol-Jurchen
conflict to the north. For the most part, the court was not inclined to depart from this
general principle. Not until his very last year in power-by which time Cheng Ch’ingchih had already assumed many of Shih Mi-yuan’s former responsibilities as chief
councilor-did there occur the necessary adjustments to effect a Sung-Mongol alliance
against the Jurchen.” 657 Thus, Song’s court carefully handled its relations with
Jurchen, and there was no large scale expedition against Jurchen. In 1233-1234, only
Meng Gong’s 15,000 armies sent to eliminate Jin, but Jin was too weak and fallen.
Raise of Bandits Due to Economic Problems
Southern expedition and raise of bandits was interrelated. Jurchen official pointed out
Song and Jurchen were enemy for several generations. Song did not forget to recover
the lost land, thus Jurchen had to aware Song subsidize the bandits.658 It revealed that
Jurchen worried Song’s patriotism led to the instability of border region.
Historians used to point out the confrontation between Jurchen and Song related to
ethnic conflict. Li Tianming pointed out the raise of bandits was due to their 100
years hatred to Jurchen.659 Huang Kuanchong suggested that people in the Central
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Plains think of Song, under the depression from Jurchen and their hometown was
demolished through wars, then they escaped into countryside and rebelled.660 He also
quoted that Li Quan “preferred to be ghost in Jiang Huai rather being Jurchen’s
official.”661 Their research showed commoners in Shandong had strong anti-Jurchen
sentiment. After relocation of capital, Jurchen did not recover the prefectures
destroyed by Mongols, but Jurchen’s suppress to the bandits affected commoners.
Jurchen General Tian Zuo garrisoned in Heshuo collected too much from commoners,
thus people hated Jurchen’s authority.662 On the other hand, another official in Zizhou
(Zibo) collected tax under regulation, thus bandits could not expend in that region.663
Shandong turned poverty after Mongols’ attack, but Jurchen increased intensity to
collect from public, thus commoners turned into bandits.
Huang also acknowledged that the rebellion force conducted business activity, and
strengthened their power through pirate activity.664 These bandits rebelled did not for
the sake of Han ethnic, but just for their own interest. For example, Li Quan in fact
benefited from pirate activity through controlling Shandong region. 665 Also, after the
division of bandits, Xia Quan, Wang Yishen, Fang Chengjin, head of bandits defected
to Jin. Li Quan also planned to negotiate with Jurchen. 666 Jurchen officials also
noticed Li Quan was crafty that bullying Song by flaunting Mongols’ power.667 In
fact he had intention to defect to Jin.668 Thus, these bandits just based on poverty and
damage of Shandong, and called on people to join the rebellion force to against
Jurchen, and to lobby for subsidy from Song with the title of “loyalist”. In fact they
were just taking economic advantages through the chaotic situation between
Mongols, Jurchen and Song. Huang stated the rebellion of bandits led to the fall of
Jurchen authority.669 It’s true that the bandits occupied Shandong, and assisted Song
to defend Jurchen attack. Thus, Jurchen’s southern expedition failed. Later the
collapse of bandits led to the Mongols to take over the region, providing an alternate
route for them to approach Henan.
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Lack of Horses to Suppress Bandits
The lack of war horses also undermined the military power. It was due to the
loss of horse’s breeding ground and import from Xi Xia.
Heshuo and Manchuria were the breeding ground of war horses. Horses were bred in
Heshuo region, including Hebei, Zhongdu and Xijing, 670 but not in the southern
region. The state had to offer large amount of cash to buy the horses from
commoners. 671 Song also increased the price of horses to limit Jurchen purchase
horses after southern expedition.672 The limited supply of horses reduced the power
of cavalry and limited the power to suppress bandits. Tao Jing-shen pointed out Jin
could not suppress the bandits because of lack of horses supply and thus there was no
cavalry.673 Sun Jiangquan’s stated the sources of horses from Hebei and trading with
Xi Xia, thus there was crisis on supplying horses for cavalry. 674 The loss of horses
supply explained why Jurchen could not field much cavalry in Shandong. Jin had
mobilized most of the cavalry to defend the capital and Shanxi.675 Some were put in
the battlefield against Mongols. Thus, Jurchen’s loss of the supply of cavalry
explained the revival of Red Jacket Bandits.
Xuanzong failed to Revival the State
Xuanzong aimed to revive the state and extending the achievement of mid Jin
Dynasty. The compiler of biographies of three censors commented that when
Xuanzong succeeded the throne, he planned to revive the state so that it could be as
strong as it was during the reign of Shizong (1161-1189). But his actions did not fit
his lofty words.. The southern expedition during the reign of Zhenyou led to a
massive loss of life. The Censors Xu Gu, Wanyan Sulan and Chen Gui all pointed out
the problems. Xuanzong knew they were loyal but rejected their opinion. Thus it was
difficult to revive the state similar to Shizong. 676 Xuanzong adopted similar
economic policies compared with Zhangzong, including the southern expedition, and
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the increase of tax. However, most policies were poorly executed and administered,
and eventually deteriorated overall governance. Xuanzong lamented that Shuhu
Gaoqi and Tuanduo damaged the interest of the states, and was arrested with remorse
in his later life.677 Both of them were punished, eventually, but the eight years of
ruling by these two wicked officials meant losing the opportunity to recover. In its
southern expedition, the court of Xuanzong acted like a mad gambler. At first, the
Jurchens did gain a few victories here and there in their southern expedition. But as
the war progressed, they continued their campaign even as the supplies were reduced,
in the hope that a larger victory would allow them to demand more favourable terms
at the negotiation. Yet, they even refused to terminate the war when they lost Heshuo
region to the Red Jacket Bandits. Eventually, the fleeing of households destroyed the
remaining economic foundation of Jin Dynasty.
After relocation of capital, Jurchen suffered a server lack of resources.
Xuanzong intended to solve it through the southern expedition, but the
expedition itself was already beyond the resources capacity of the Jin to support.
The fleeing of households and loss of Heshuo and Shandong fundamentally
undermined the state’s strength. The Jurchen. by then, not only had lost the
ability to recover lost territory, but also no longer had the means to support its
army for defense purposes.
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Appendices
Table 5: Flooding in Rivers since 1163 (Recorded in Treatise of Rivers and
Canals)
Year

River

Region

Effects

1168

Yellow River

Ligudu 李 固 渡 , Affecting Caozhou and
Danzhou in Shandong, court
Anyang
send Water minister Liang
Shu to seek for solution.
Ligudu constructed a dam

Hutuo River 滹沱 Zhengding 真定
河
1171

Yellow River

1177

Yellow River

Wangcun
王
Xingyang 滎陽
Baigou, Hebei

Hutuo River

Baimagang

Yellow River

Weizhou
Jingdong
Yanjing

1180

Spent twenty-eight thousand
labor to repair the dam
村 Affected Henan’s Mengzhou
and Weizhou
Used 11500 manpower daily
to spend 60 days to repair
the dam
Spent 500 labor to repair

dam

and Affected Guide. Spend
in 24000 manpower working
70 days to construct a dam
from Weizhou to Guide. Tax
was exempted in that year
River flowed in new path

1181

Yellow River

NIL

1185

Lugou River

1186

Yellow River

1189

Yellow River

Xiangtongzhai and Ordered the labors located
Shangyangcun
300 li around Zhongdu to
repair, but suspended after it
flooded again
Weizhou
Damaged the dam in
Weizhou and destroyed the
city. Later affected Daming
fu
Caozhou
Used six million and eighty
thousand work unit to
construct dam. Four million
and three hundred thousand
of them are commoner’s
labor, others are military
manpower. Each work unit
paying one hundred and fifty
wen. The daily expenditure
for official’s salary was fifty
107

wen with half litter of rice678
1189

Lugou River

Divert the river

1191

Lugou River and
Zhang River

1194

Yellow River

Two Years later, spend three
hundred and eighty thousand
work unit to repair the dam,
recruit the refugee as labor
Affected Fengqiu

Yangwu, Hebei

Source: Jin Shi, Chapter 27, pp. 669-688.

678

Jin Shi, Chapter 27, Treatise of Rivers and Canals, p. 674
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Table 6: Serious Flooding in Henan
Year

Region

Effects

1171

Wangcun 王 Affected Henan’s Mengzhou and Weizhou
村 Xingyang
滎陽, Henan

1216
1220

Sizhou,

Lots of people die along the road. People only eating grass

Henan

root and tree bark679

Henan

Half of households fled, led to farmlands uncultivated, affect
the government’s income. Government exempted tax and
encourage farming680

Source: Jin Shi, Chapter 23, pp. 537-545.
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Table 7: Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced in Different Regions
Salt

Production Price (per piculs, or 120 New Price in 1199 (per Increased %

Regions

catty)

piculs, or 120 catty)

Shandong, Baodi 3 strings and 600 wen#

5 strings and 160 wen

43

and Cangzhou
Xiezhou

5 strings*

6 strings 400 wen*

28

Liaodong

900 wen

1 string and 500 wen

67

Beijing

900 wen

1 string and 500 wen

67

Xijing

2 strings

2 strings 800 wen

40

Mixed salt 撈鹽

1 string 500 wen

2 strings

33

*The weight unit is 1 xi, with 116 catty
# It was calculated by the price in 1189, that the salt selling 30 wen per catty
Source: Jin Shi, 49, pp. 1100-1101.
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Table 8: Income of Salt Tax in Different Places
Previous Tax Income

New Tax Income (since

Increased

1199)

%

Shandong

2,547,336 strings

4,334,184 strings

70.1

Cangzhou

1,531,200 strings

2,766,636 strings

80.7

Baodi

887,558 strings 600 wen

1,348,839 strings

52.0

Xiezhou

814,657 strings

1,321,520 strings 256 wen

62.2

Liaodong

131,572 strings 800 wen

376,970 strings 256 wen

Beijing

213,892 strings 500 wen

346,151 strings 617 wen 2
fen

Xijing

100,419 strings 696 wen

280,264 strings 608 wen

Total

6,226,636 strings 566

10,774,512 strings 137 wen

wen
Source: Jin Shi, 49, p. 1101
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186.5
61.8
179.1
73.0

Conversion of Measurements

Weight
Picul 石= 31 kg
Hu 斛=15.5 kg
Peck 斗 =3.1 kg
Litre 升 =310g
Catty 斤 =258.24g
Cash
Taels 兩 =2 strings
String 貫 =1000 wen
Wen 文
Area
Qing 頃 =100 mu
Mu 畝=666.66 m2
Sources: Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual, Cambridge:
Harvard University Asia Center, 2000.
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